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I. INTRODUCTION
Henry II of England encouraged the use of litigation as a way to
decrease lawlessness in an unruly bunch of Anglo-Saxons, thus founding
the common law. On a domestic level, litigation remains an important
means of resolving conflict without resorting to force or violence. The
same principle applies on a global level. This article argues that trade
remedies, problematic though they may be, provide a legal framework in
which litigation can and must be promulgated to protect the benefits of a
global market economy.
Though trade remedies are anti-market by nature and problematic in
application, their negative effects are limited, because the underlying
premise of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") is one of
free trade, and because protectionist remedies are deliberately cumbersome
and expensive. Major market participants bring such actions as another
competitive tool in their arsenal, and use that tool primarily during periods
of economic recession. Once a local economy begins an upsurge, such
remedies either become irrelevant due to rising prices or are eventually
repealed based on market demand. While the costs of such proceedings are
exorbitantly high for all parties involved directly or indirectly-petitioners,
respondents, governmental agencies, and consumers-those fees can be
considered as the cost of doing business. The anti-market effects of trade
remedies are offset by the gain in international transparency, accountability,
and predictability.
There are essentially four positions one can take with respect to the
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role of law in a global economy: 1) mercantilism, 2) doctrinaire
libertarianism, 3) doctrinaire socialism, and 4) enlightened political
economy. Under mercantilism, law has no role in a global economy. This
is the Hobbesian "state of nature" in which one views the global economy
like a game of Monopoly where the object is for a country to bankrupt its
competitors; the economy is an extension of national political or ideological
goals.1 Like mercantilism, those who espouse doctrinaire libertarianism
(otherwise known as anarcho-capitalism) similarly believe that law has no
role in a global economy. Doctrinaire libertarians see free-market
capitalism as the basis for a free society and advocate that the state, law
enforcement, courts, national defense, and all other governmental services
should be replaced by voluntarily-funded competitors in a free market, and
that personal and economic activities be completely deregulated.2
In contrast with mercantilists and doctrinaire libertarians, doctrinaire
socialists believe that law should have a dominant role in a global economy.
Under this view, the role of political and legal institutions is to create a
planned economy in which the means of production are owned collectively
and equality is given a high priority.3 Enlightened political economists
similarly believe that legal institutions have an important role in a global
economy. However, rather than dominating that economy with an eye
towards forcing equality, they believe that the role of law and legal
institutions such as the World Trade Organization ("WTO") is to help move
a world defined by diverse political entities in the direction of greater free
trade. The foundational premise of the WTO is that of enlightened political
economy,4 and this article will be developed with the same approach.
Part II of this article begins with an explanation of GATT's basic
operating principles, what effect the operation of those principles has had
on the global trade of goods, and introduces the policies underlying the
1 "Mercantilism is an economic theory that holds that the prosperity of a nation depends
upon its supply of capital, and that the global volume of trade is 'unchangeable."'
Wikipedia, Mercantilism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercantilism (last visited Mar. 8,
2008). Thus, the ruling government should play a protectionist role by encouraging exports
and discouraging imports through the use of tariffs. Id.; see also Daniel J. Gifford, Trade
and Tensions, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 297 (2006) (discussing residual mercantilism in
international relations as justification for international trade rules).
2 See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 159-98 (1998); Walter Block,
Rejoinder to Holcombe on the Inevitability of Government, 21 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 49
(2007); Walter Block, Anarchism and Minarchism; No Rapprochement Possible: Reply to
Tibor Machan, 21 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 91 (2007).
3 See GRAHAM BANNOCK, RON BAXTER & EVAN DAVIS, Socialism, in DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 360, 360 (4th ed. 2003).
4 See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Principles of the Trading
System, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Mar.
8, 2008); see also Donald Boudreaux, Dobbs's Disciples, TCS DAILY, Apr. 17, 2006,
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1616779/posts (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
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three trade remedies. Part III outlines the legal requirements of the WTO
trade remedies (antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards), as well
as the WTO Dispute Resolution process and its impact on trade remedy
disputes. Part IV provides a history of how the three trade remedies
developed, including their implementation in the United States. Part V
gives a numerical analysis of the past decade of antidumping,
countervailing duties, and safeguards actions as reported to the WTO. Part
VI discusses some of the criticism that has been leveled at trade remedies,
particularly antidumping. Finally, Part VII provides a contextual defense of
unfair trade remedies, concluding that while they have little or nothing to do
with unfair trade, their use as a limited political 'escape hatch' against a
background norm of freer trade has ultimately resulted in freer global trade,
and that limitation should be extended to include stronger limitations on
agricultural subsidies.
II. CONTEXT: GATT'S FREER TRADE PRINCIPLES AND UNFAIR
TRADE REMEDIES
A. The World Trade Organization and Freer Trade
Consistent with the goal of freer trade, the World Trade Organization,
established in 1994, is based on a presumption that market economies help
establish stronger nations, and it is focused on reducing trade barriers (such
as tariffs) between nations. The primary function of the WTO is to set rules
of trade between nations. 5 It is the vehicle of enactment for several
multinational agreements, of which the GATT treaty is one.6 In setting up a
trade regime, the WTO's stated primary goal is to encourage international
commerce: although trade does not ensure peace, it discourages war.7 Thus,
the goal of the WTO is to encourage trade among Members by setting
predictable rules, encouraging freer trade and competition, and providing
benefits for less developed nations.8 The WTO does not mandate free trade,
5 See World Trade Organization, The WTO... In Brief, http://www.wto.org/english
/thewtoe/whatise/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm [hereinafter WTO In Brief] (last visited Mar. 8,
2008).
6 See Understanding the WTO: Principles of the Trading System, supra note 4.
7 See, e.g., 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Debra Winthrop eds., trans., University of Chicago Press 2000) (1840); BARON DE CHARLES
DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. 20, ch. 2 (Anne M. Cohler, et. al.
eds., Cambridge University Press 1989) (1748); STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE
MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 297 (Viking Press 2002); All Free Traders Now?,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 1996, at 21 (quoting Richard Cobden, "[firee trade.. .is God's
diplomacy, and there is no other certain way of uniting people in the bonds of peace"); see
generally IMMANUEL KANT, To Perpetual Peace, A Philosophical Sketch, in PERPETUAL
PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 107, 107-39 (Ted Humphrey trans., Hackett Pub. 1983).
8 See WTO In Brief, supra note 5.
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but instead establishes a framework of rules enabling WTO Members to
progress towards freer trade by reducing tariffs and making voluntary trade
concessions. This discourages Members from engaging in certain kinds of
trade discrimination against fellow Members.
9
To use a war-time analogy, assume that before GATT, nations
assumed a war-like stance against each other in trade, guarding their
borders zealously with raised swords consisting of tariffs, duties, subsidies,
and other methods to keep out intruding imports. (Such remains the case
with regard to agricultural subsidies, as yet relatively untouched by
international accords.) 10 The GATTAVTO mechanism has been a series of
world-wide peace-keeping negotiations that work by getting nations to
gradually lower their swords: "I'll lower my sword 15%, if you lower yours
14%." Typically, the WTO encourages developed countries to make larger
concessions than developing or lesser developed countries are making. The
war analogy works here as well: the bigger, stronger countries initially
agree to lower their swords (import tariffs and duties). Then, in response to
good faith by the larger countries, the smaller countries gradually lower
their tariffs as well.
There are several reasons for encouraging freer trade. Tariffs and other
trade barriers are akin to hidden taxes that increase prices to consumers in
developed countries, discouraging purchasers from buying the taxed goods,
and discouraging potential importers from marketing lower-cost goods.11
Thus, in developed countries, these hidden taxes burden the poor and are
"deadweight losses," which merely raise the price of a good. Freer trade
is beneficial for developing countries as well as for developed states. In
developing countries, the effect of trade barriers may be worse: typically,
developing countries produce lower priced goods than do developed
countries, but developed countries' tariffs discourage the exportation of
those lower priced goods.' 3  Moreover, developing countries' internal
barriers against importations from other countries cause their economies
further harm. Thus, both developed and developing countries benefit from
freer trade with lower prices for consumers.
B. Demonstrated Effect of GATT's Freer-trade Policies
World Bank research suggests that openness to global trade has
promoted economic equality and reduced poverty: 800 million people
escaped from poverty in the 1990s, during a period of globalization
9 JAMES BACCHUS, TRADE AND FREEDOM 39 (Cameron May 2004).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 290-300.
1 See BACCHUS, supra note 9, at 214.
12 id.
13 See id. at 215.
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accelerated by GATT and the WTO's lowering of trade barriers. 14 Those
developing countries that have been open to trade have grown faster than
those that have isolated themselves economically, and this greater openness
to international trade, rather than making things worse, has narrowed the
gap between rich and poor countries.15 According to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), developing countries
benefit the most from liberalized trade. In 1999, OECD figures indicated
that further trade liberalization enabled India's Gross Domestic Product
("GDP") to grow by 9.6%, China's by 5.5%, and Sub-Sahara Africa's by
3.7%.16
India is a prime example of the benefits of free trade for a developing
nation. In 1951, India withdrew from international trade and raised tariffs
and taxes. As a consequence, its economic growth shrunk from 7.7% a year
in 1961 to 4% in 1980, and it became one of the worst-performing
developing economies of that era.1 7  Then, after four decades of state
planning, India began embracing a free-market economy in 1991.18 Since
the economic reforms of 1991, parts of India have rapidly moved from
poverty to prosperity and much of the nation has emerged as a vigorous
free-market democracy. Poverty in India has not been eradicated, but India
now ranks as one of the ten largest emerging markets in the world, with the
largest middle class.' 9
Since the enactment of GATT after World War II, tariffs on goods
among the 149 WTO Members have been reduced from high double-digits
to less than 4%.20 As a result of this reduction, global trade has increased
six-fold,2' and merchandise exports have grown by 6% annually since
14 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: 50 YEARS OF
ACHIEVEMENT 23 (1998); David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 126-27, available at http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/Stephen
/dollarkray.pdf.
15 Dollar & Kraay, supra note 14, at 120; see also JOHAN NORBERG, IN DEFENSE OF
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 54-59 (Cato Institute 2003) (arguing that the 1999 UN Human
Development Report's conclusion that global inequality has increased is erroneous because
those numbers were not adjusted for purchasing power, and that in fact, inequality between
countries has been continuously declining since the 1970s, in accord with figures provided
by the Norwegian Institute for Foreign Affairs).
16 See BACCHUS, supra note 9, at 215 (citing Mike Moore, Opening Address, WTO
Ministerial Conference, Seattle, Washington (Nov. 30, 1999)).
17 See NORBERG, supra note 15, at 21.
18 Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note:
India, Oct. 2007, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
19 See NORBERG, supra note 15, at 21-23. While India is a success story in its move away
from a socialist controlled economy to one based on a free market, unfortunately Russia's
history has not been as successful due to difficulties in establishing the rule of law.
20 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 5.
21 See WTO In Brief, supra note 5.
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1950.22 In fact, the result has been a precipitous increase in global trade of
merchandise, from $6 trillion in 1996 3 (two years after the creation of the
WT0 24) to in excess of $10 trillion in 2006.25 Furthermore, the percentage
of people living at or below the poverty level has decreased from 44% of
the world's population in 1980 to 13% by the end of 2002.26
Thus, the GATT/WTO freer trade policies have clearly been beneficial
to both developed and developing nations.27 In encouraging freer trade
among nations, however, the WTO rules reflect a concern that Members
may on occasion need to defend individual industries against unfair trade or
may need to protect a particularly vulnerable industry, and they therefore
provide three trade remedies: three causes of action a country can use to
defend its industries as an alternative to trade barriers and trade wars.
C. WTO Basic Rules
WTO Member obligations are based on three basic rules: 1) binding
concessions, 2) most-favored nation treatment, and 3) national treatment.
Binding concessions means that if a Member voluntarily concedes to lower
its tariff barriers to worldwide trade, then those concessions are binding.2 8
Most favored nation treatment means that a Member must give the same
22 Martin Wolf, Trade Expansion Remains the Engine of Growth, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29,
1999, at 2 1.
23 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO ANNUAL REPORT 1996 10 (1996).
24 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1143 (1994).
25 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO ANNUAL REPORT 2006 4 (2006).
26 See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997 12 (Oxford University Press 1997) (observing that world
poverty has fallen more during the past 50 years since the creation of GATT than during the
preceding 500); SURJIT S. BHALLA, IMAGINE THERE'S No COUNTRY: POVERTY, INEQUALITY,
AND GROWTH IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Institute for International Economics 2002)
(finding that worldwide poverty has fallen precipitously).
27 Least developed nations ("LDNs"), have been unable to participate fully in the benefits
provided by GATT because of several continuing problems. One problem is that their
economies are largely based on agriculture, and their production cannot compete with the
heavily subsidized commodities produced by developed worlds. Kevin C. Kennedy, The
Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa:
Sowing the Seeds of False Hope for Sub-Saharan Africa's Cotton Farmers?, 14 KAN. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 307, 310 (2005); see also Uche U. Ewelukwa, Centuries of Globalization;
Centuries of Exclusion: African Women, Human Rights, and the "New'" International Trade
Regime, 20 BERK. J. GENDER L. & JUST. 75, 128-30 (2005) (discussing barriers faced by
women farmers in least developed and developing countries). Other problems include
severe debt, disease, and lack of necessary infrastructure. See Kennedy, at 338; Uche U.
Ewelukwa, Special and Differential Treatment in International Trade Law: A Concept in
Search of Content, 79 N.D. L. REV 831, 863 (2003).
28 BACCHUS, supra note 9, at 40.
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treatment to all trading partners that are Members of the WTO, and must
not discriminate among different foreign producers of like imported
products2 9  In other words, once a Member country submits its yearly
schedule of tariffs to the WTO, imports of those goods from any other
member may not be subjected to duties in excess of those basic tariffs.30
Furthermore, national treatment prevents the favoring of domestic goods
over foreign goods once a foreign good has entered the domestic market.
3 1
D. Exceptions to Freer Trade: the WTO's Three Trade Remedies
In theory, the three trade remedies-antidumping measures,
countervailing duties, and safeguard measures-are WTO-sanctioned
measures a member country can use to temporarily protect a vulnerable
domestic industry from competition by imposing duties on a particular
product above and beyond the amount listed in its schedule.
No measure is to be implemented without a WTO-prescribed
investigation by the domestic government into whether the measure is
justified under rules set by the WTO.32 The investigation is in fact a
detailed litigation procedure conducted by a government agency, and
requires that the agency give full hearing to both the plaintiff domestic
industry and the defendant importers before reaching a decision.
Analogizing to United States legal terminology, WTO rules require due
process before any such extraordinary tariffs may be imposed. The decision
must be justified on the basis of the evidence adduced in the investigation. 33
In all three cases, when the measure is put into place, additional duties or
tariffs are superimposed above and beyond those the importing country
agreed to in its WTO schedule, so that the domestic industry is no longer
29 Id. at 4 1.
30 There are certain exceptions. For example, countries within a region may set up a free
trade agreement that does not apply to goods from outside the group. Id. NAFTA is one
such free trade agreement.
31 id.
32 See generally World Trade Organization, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15. 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/does e/legal e/19-adp.pdf [hereinafter Anti-
dumping Agreement]; id. at 1154 (Annex 1 A, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods-
Results of the Uruguay Round), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/05-
anxla.pdf; see also World Trade Organization, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, art. 1 (Apr. 15, 1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/24-
scm.pdf [hereinafter CVD Agreement]; World Trade Organization, Agreement on
Safeguards, art. 10 (Apr. 15, 1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e
/25-safeg.pdf [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement]; Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, art. 3.2, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1199-1200
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/03-fa.pdf.
33 See supra note 32.
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threatened or injured by lower import prices.34  Thus, all three measures
result in a higher domestic price for the particular product at issue and are
anti-competitive in nature. A number of economists argue, therefore, that
such measures are inherently unproductive and should not be used.3 5
The purported justification for the imposition of such trade remedies is
that they are needed to correct inefficiencies in the free market. The theory
behind antidumping and countervailing duty laws is quite simple: it
suggests that producers of merchandise in foreign lands are able to take
advantage of protected home markets to produce and export goods at
artificially low prices. 36 When "dumped" (cut-price export) products are
sold in the target country, their low prices cut into the profits of domestic
like products, thereby harming the local industry. Subsidized products-
such as imports whose low prices reflect financial support provided by the
home government-cause similar harm to a target industry by distorting the
local market: local manufacturers conclude that they cannot produce the
product at a competitive price and they decrease or cease production. Thus,
both antidumping and countervailing duties protect a domestic industry
from imported products that are being sold at what is concluded to be an
unfairly low price by certain specific importers from certain specific
countries. Antidumping measures protect a domestic industry from
imported products that are being sold at predatory prices below production
cost. Countervailing duties protect from imported products sold at low
prices that are the result of subsidization by the foreign government.
Both antidumping and countervailing duty measures are justified under
WTO rules as an exception to the freer-trade policy because they
theoretically protect a domestic industry from the unfair trade practices of
one or more specific countries. Because they are an exception to the
scheduled tariffs, however, the WTO includes a built-in "sunset" or
termination rule: antidumping tariffs and countervailing duties are to be
reviewed regularly and terminated when no longer needed because they
otherwise artificially inflate the price of the product at issue to domestic
consumers.
37
34 See, e.g., Antidumping Agreement, supra note 32, art. 3.1 ("determination of
injury .... shall be based on positive evidence..."); CVD Agreement, supra note 32, art.
11.2 (an application unsubstantiated by relevant evidence is insufficient); Safeguards
Agreement, supra note 32, art. 4.1 (b) ("a determination of the existence of a threat of
serious injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture, or remote
possibility...").
35 See, e.g., Walter Block & Michael Gries, Predator: Anti-Dumping Regulations,
CONSENT 29, Sept. 1998, at 9-10; Robert W. McGee & Walter Block, Ethical Aspects of
Initiating Anti Dumping Actions, 24 INT'L J. Soc. ECON 599, 599-608 (1997).
36 Peter D. Ehrenhaft & Charlotte G. Meriwether, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979:
SmallAidfor Trade?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1107, 1116-17 (1984).
37 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 32, art. 11.3; CVD Agreement supra note 32 art.
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The third trade protection mechanism provided under WTO rules, the
safeguard measure, is designed to temporarily protect a weak, vulnerable
domestic industry from all competition for a limited period to provide a
domestic industry with a temporary monopoly while it improves its
international competitiveness.38 During the period of time the safeguard
measure is in effect, all imports of similar products from any country face
an extra tariff.39 The theoretical justification for a safeguard measure is that
it provides a broad tool to help a struggling home industry, to be used only
in very limited circumstances, and only for a maximum of four years,
during which time it must be phased-out.
Since the inception of the WTO in 1995, and especially in the years
1998-2003, the use of the three unfair trade measures-particularly
antidumping measures-mushroomed, and developing countries are now
initiating more antidumping measures than are developed countries.
40
While developed countries such as the United States and the European
Union still have more measures in place, the larger and more successful
developing countries such as China, India, and Mexico, are quickly
catching up.4 1 Commentators in 1997 predicted that one of the remedies,
antidumping, would become the "weapon of choice for import protection,"
used much more extensively than the others,4 2 and this in fact has proven to
be the case.43
21.3
38 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 32, art. 2.2 ("Safeguard measures shall be applied
to a product begin imported irrespective of its source.").
39 Id.
40 See infra Graph 1 based on information provided by the World Trade Organization.
COMM. ON ANTI-DUMPING PRACTICES, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO REPORT (2006)
OF THE COMM. ON ANTI-DUMPING PRACTICES, G/L/791 (Oct. 27, 2006), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/adp-e/adpe.htm [hereinafter ANTI-DUMPING COMMITTEE
REPORT].
41 COMM. ON ANTI-DUMPING PRACTICES, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, REPORT (2005)
OF THE COMM. ON ANTI-DuMPING PRACTICES, ANNEX D, G/L/758 (Nov. 2, 2005), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/adp-e/adpe.htm (indicating that for the 2004-2005
period, while the European Communities reported 152 preliminary and final anti-dumping
actions and the United States reported 351, India reported fifty-nine, China thirty-nine, and
Mexico fifty-five).
42 Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New Millennium: The Ascendancy of
Antidumping Measures, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 49, 53 (1997).
43 Compare ANTI-DUMPING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 40 (indicating that anti-
dumping measures in force totaled 1099 in 2006), with COMM. ON SUBSIDIES AND
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, REPORT (2006) OF THE COMM.
ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES, ANNEX D, G/L/798 (Nov. 8, 2006),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/scme/scme.htm (indicating 79
countervailing duty actions), and COMM. ON SAFEGUARDS TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN
GOODS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, REPORT (2006) OF THE COMM. ON SAFEGUARDS TO
THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS, ANNEX 2, G/L/795 (Nov. 3, 2006), available at
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III. TRADE REMEDIES AND THE WTO LEGAL GUIDELINES
Each WTO member nation adopts its own version of antidumping,
countervailing duty, and safeguards laws; nevertheless, the WTO
Antidumping, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and Safeguards
Agreements set certain detailed parameters for such laws. These
parameters are quite complex, and only a summary is offered below.
A. Antidumping Laws
Under the Antidumping Agreement, a WTO Member has the right to
apply an antidumping measure against an import that is dumped in its
domestic market only when the dumped import causes or threatens to cause
material injury to a domestic industry. Thus, the Member government must
investigate two separate issues: 1) whether the import was dumped, and 2)
whether the dumped import caused or threatened to cause material injury.
1. Preliminary Procedure
The process begins when a domestic industry submits a written
antidumping petition or application. Domestic producers whose collective
output constitutes at least 25% of domestic like product must support that
application, submitted by or on behalf of a domestic industry. The
application must also "substantiate" its allegations with evidence. Thus, it
must include not only the identity of the industry and a list of all known
domestic producers, but also a description of the volume and value of
domestic production, a complete description of the allegedly dumped
product including country of origin, and a list identifying each known
importer.45 The application must also include the price of the allegedly
dumped product when sold in its home market, the price at which it is being
sold as imported, and information on how much product was imported
during the period of time covered by the application (i.e. evidence of
dumping).46 In addition to this "dumping" information, the application
must include evidence of material injury or threat to cause material injury,
as well as detailed evidence that the dumped product caused the injury or
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/safeg-e/safeg-e.htm (indicating II safeguard definitive
measures).
44 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 32, art. 5.4 ("The application shall be considered
to have been made 'by or on behalf of the domestic industry' if it is supported by those
domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50% of the total
production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing
either support for or opposition to the application. However, no investigation shall be
initiated when domestic producers expressly supporting the application account for less than
25% of the total production of the like product produced by the domestic industry.").
41 Id. art. 5.2 (i)-(ii).
41 Id. art. 5.2 (iii)-(iv).
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threat and exclude other possible causes.4 7
2. Governmental Procedures
Once an application is made, if the governmental agency determines
after preliminary review that it appears to be factually justified, the
governmental agency then initiates an investigation and notifies the
48
exporting country's government of the investigation. The investigating
agency also notifies all interested parties, giving them ample opportunity to
present in writing all evidence they consider relevant, and it sends foreign
producer and exporter questionnaires, giving them at least thirty days for
reply and granting extensions upon request whenever practicable.49
Transparency is required: evidence presented by one interested party must
be promptly made available to other interested parties participating in the
investigation, unless the information is confidential. 50 All interested parties
must be given a full opportunity to defend their interests. Where one party
provides information that may be of a significant competitive advantage to
a competitor, and which it wants the investigating agency to treat as
confidential, it must also provide a non-confidential summary thereof that
the investigating body can provide to the other interested parties. 51
3. Substantive Law: Definition of Dumping and Material Injury
In addition to detailing specifics of what must be included in an
antidumping application, and specifics about procedural requirements, the
Antidumping ("AD") Agreement also gives detailed definitions of the two
requisite terms: a dumped product and requisite material injury to a
domestic industry. A product is dumped when it is introduced into the
commerce of another country at less than normal value, meaning that the
export price is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
trade, for the same product in its home country.52 The margin of dumping is
the difference between the two prices: the home market price per unit
(normal value per unit) minus the export price per unit, expressed as a
percentage of the normal value. Once the export and home market price are
determined, and the margin of dumping calculated, if the margin of
dumping is de minimus (less than 2%), and the volume of dumped imports
accounts for less than 3% of imports, then the investigation must be
47 Id. art. 3.5.
41 Id. art. 5.5.
49 Id. arts. 6.1-6.1.1.
50 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 32, art. 6.1.2.
51 Id. art. 6.5.1.
52 Id. art. 2.1.
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immediately terminated.1
3
Assuming that the product was dumped, and the margin of dumping is
greater than de minimus, then the presence and extent or absence of injury is
determined. To this end, the volume of the dumped imports and the effect
of the dumped imports on domestic prices must be determined, as well as
the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such
prices.54 The investigating authorities must consider whether there was a
significant increase in dumped imports in the time period under
investigation, whether there was significant price undercutting by those
dumped imports, or whether the dumped imports affected prices either by
depressing them to a significant degree or by preventing price increases to a
significant degree. Furthermore,
[t]he examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the
domestic industry concemed shall include an evaluation of all
relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state
of the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales,
profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or
utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the
magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative
effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth,
ability to raise capital or investments.
55
Consequently, the determination of a threat of material injury must be based
on facts, and not merely on allegation, conjecture, or remote possibility, and
must be supported by solid economic evidence. 56 Before an antidumping
measure is employed, the investigation must demonstrate not only material
injury or threat thereof to the domestic inju 7 , but also a causal relationship
between the dumped imports and the injury.
In sum, in order to impose an antidumping duty, the governmental
agency must demonstrate 1) that the imported product was dumped
(exported for a significantly lower price than it was or would have been
sold for in its country of origin), and 2) that the dumping caused significant
injury to domestic industry. Finally, the Antidumping Agreement requires
WTO members to revoke antidumping measures after five years unless,
after a "sunset" review initiated before that date, the agency determines that
the measures continue to be necessary to ensure the non-occurrence of
dumping.
3 Id. art. 5.8.
4 Id. art. 3.1.
55 Id. art. 3.4.
56 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 32, art. 3.7.
17 Id. art. 3.5.
58 Id. art. 11.3.
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B. Anti-subsidy Measures or Countervailing Duties
If the imported product was not sold below production price, but
instead the low export price was enabled by a government subsidy, then the
appropriate cause of action is one of anti-subsidy/countervailing duty
("CVD") rather than antidumping. Otherwise, the procedure is quite similar
to that of an antidumping claim. Governments subsidize economic
activities for many reasons, 59 most of which do not run afoul of the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("CVD Accord").6 °
Governments may use subsidies to diminish economic hardships, or to
expand activity in certain sectors: typically, governments give financial
support to ailing industries, to stimulate infant industries, and to promote
exports.6 1 Subsidization may help a home industry or sector; however, a
product whose export was subsidized can significantly distort competition
in the destination country when it is sold at a price lower than the local
equivalent. Theoretically, the effect is similar to that of a dumped product,
but the cause is somewhat different. Nevertheless, because the effect is the
same, so is the ultimate remedy: an additional duty is levied.
As mentioned previously, only a few types of subsidies are prohibited
under the CVD Accord, including subsidies conditioned on export
performance or on local content, i.e. subsidies that favor domestic goods
over foreign merchandise and imports.6 2 Other subsidies can be used as the
basis of a Countervailing Duty action if they cause adverse effects on the
domestic industry.6 3 Permissible subsidies include those encouraging
research and development, or subsidizing underdeveloped regions, or
compensating domestic industries' efforts to comply with specific
environmental regulations.64  Notably, agricultural subsidies remain
widespread and problematic, though due to vociferous demand by
developing and least developed countries that such subsidies be
discontinued, WTO members have agreed in principle to do so. 6 5 Because
the effect of a subsidized product is similar to that of a dumped one, the
59 Terence P. Stewart, U.S.-Japan Economic Disputes: The Role of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Laws, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 689, 702 (1999).
60 CVD Agreement, supra note 32, arts. 3.1, 5-6.
61 Id. art. 8.2.
62 Id. arts. 3. l(a)-(b).
63 Id. arts. 5-6.
64 Id. arts. 8.2(a)-(c).
65 See Stewart supra note 59, at 704. Although WTO members have agreed in principle
to prohibit agricultural subsidies, agreement of when and how to do so has not yet been
reached. However, pressure from the least developed countries in Africa, who claim that
they cannot profitably farm cotton due to large U.S. subsidies, may bring about change. The
United States, at the Hong Kong Ministerial conference in December 2005, agreed to
terminate its cotton subsidies in an effort to break the stalemate the WTO has experienced
with regard to rolling back agricultural subsidies.
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provisions of the CVD Accord are very similar to those in the Antidumping
Agreement.
1. Definition of Subsidy
The CVD Accord provides that a government may levy a
countervailing duty on an imported product that was subsidized by its home
government. A subsidy is defined as a financial contribution, and can be in
the form of a direct transfer of funds (grant, loans, equity infusion), or
government revenue foregone or not collected (i.e. tax credits), the
provision of goods or services other than general infrastructure, or the
purchase of goods, or the making of payments to a funding mechanism, or
any other form of income or price support.66 Thus, any subsidization of an
industrial product in such a way as to specifically encourage its exportation
or disfavor imported components in its production is prohibited.6  If an
importing country finds that an import has been impermissibly subsidized
and has caused injury to or seriously prejudiced the interests of a domestic
industry, it can levy a countervailing duty to compensate for the
68
subsidization.
2. Countervailing Duty Procedure
As with antidumping proceedings, a CVD application must include
sufficient evidence of the existence of a subsidy, its amount (if possible),
injury, and a causal link between the subsidized imports and the alleged
material injury. 69 As with an antidumping application, a CVD application
must be supported by producers of at least 25% of domestic production,70
must list all known domestic producers, 71 and must describe the volume and
value of domestic production of the like product.72 It must also contain a
complete description of the allepedly subsidized product,7 3 the names of the
country or countries of origin,7 and the identity of each known exporter or
foreign producer,75 as well as evidence with regard to the existence,
66 CVD Agreement, supra note 32, art. 1.1.
67 Id. art. 3.1.
68 Id. art. 5.
69 Id. art. 11.2.
70 See id. art. 11.4 ("[N]o investigation shall be initiated when domestic producers
expressly supporting the application account for less than 25% of total production of the like
product produced by the domestic industry.").
71 Id. art. 11.2(i).
72 CVD Agreement, supra note 32, art. 11.2(i).
71 Id. art. 11.2(ii).
74 Id.
75 id.
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amount, and nature of the subsidy.76 Finally, it must provide evidence of
the alleged injury, including information on any increase in volume of the
allegedly subsidized imports, the effect of the imports on prices of domestic
like product, and the consequent injury to (or threat of injury) to the imports
on the domestic industry."
Once the application is filed, the domestic governmental agency must
investigate the information provided, giving all interested parties notice and
ample opportunity to reply, following procedures similar to those detailed
in the antidumping provisions.7 8 As with the antidumping rules, the CVD
Accord includes a five-year sunset review, requiring that any countervailing
duty be removed after five years unless it is found that the expiry of the
duty would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of subsidization
and injury.79
C. Safeguards
The WTO Agreement on Safeguards provides that a Member may
apply a safeguard measure to protect a product only once the Member has
determined through investigation that 1) the product is being imported into
its territory in such increased quantities as to 2) cause or threaten to cause
serious iniury (a higher standard than material injury) to the domestic
industry.8  Once this is established, safeguard measures may be applied
only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and
facilitate adjustment, and must be applied to imports irrespective of their
sources (in other words, the safeguarding government may not allow some
imports and not others).8 '
As with the antidumping and countervailing duty processes, safeguard
investigation procedures must have been previously established and made
public, including reasonable public notice to all interested parties, and
confidential information shall be treated as such.8 z A serious injury is
defined as a "significant overall impairment" in the domestic industry's
position, and a threat of serious injury means a clear and imminent threat,
both must be based on facts, not allegation, conjecture, or remote
possibility. 83 Thus, the investigation must encompass the rate and amount
of increase in imports of the product in absolute and relative terms, the
share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in the
76 Id. art. 11.2(iii).
" Id. art. 11.2(iv).
78 See generally CVD Agreement, supra note 32, art. 12.1.
71 Id. art. 21.3.
80 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 32, art. 2.1.
81 Id. art. 2.
82 Id. art. 3.1.
83 Id. art. 4.1 (a)-(b).
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level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and
losses, and employment.84
The amount of proof required, as well as due process procedural
requirements, are parallel to AD and CVD requirements, but there are more
stringent time limitations. Article 7 of the Safeguard Agreement stipulates
that a safeguard measure be in place "only for such period of time as may
be necessary to prevent or remedy" the serious injury, and that period is not
to exceed four years, unless reevaluation procedures show that it continues
to be necessary, in which case it can be extended for an absolute maximum
of an additional four years.
85
D. WTO Remedies for the Remedies: Dispute Resolution
Once a WTO member has completed the internal litigation process and
put a trade remedy in place, if the affected exporting country believes the
remedy is unjustified, it can pursue an appeal either through the
mechanisms provided under the importing country's law, or through the
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure. The WTO procedure is designed to be
completed within fifteen months, even including an appeal.8 6 The process
begins with a Member's complaint to the WTO's Dispute Resolution Body.
Once a complaint has been lodged with the WTO, the first sixty-day
stage consists of confidential consultations, conciliation, and mediation
between the two governments, because mutually acceptable solutions are
preferred over the litigation process provided in the GATT Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 87 If
consultation fails, the complaining government can then seek a panel
review of the matter, a process which can take up to six months. A Panel
consists of three to five experts from different countries who are selected,
preferably by the parties to the dispute, from a list provided by the DSB.88
After a series of hearings and drafts, the Panel issues a report stating its
opinion of which party is right, and which is wrong under the pertinent
Agreement, and why.89 The Panel Report is then passed to the Dispute
Settlement Body, which can only reject the Report by consensus.90
After the Panel Report has become final, either party can appeal it to
the Appellate Body, a permanent quasi-judicial body consisting of seven
experts in law and international trade who are appointed for four-year
84 Id. art. 4.2(a).
8 Id. art. 7.1-7.2.
86 See Understanding the WTO, supra note 4.
87 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 32, art. 305 (Annex 2, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round).
88 Id. art. 6-8.
89 Id. art. 11-16.
90 Id. art. 16 (4).
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terms. 91 Once the Appellate Body issues its decision, if the defendant
Member has lost, it is given a reasonable period of time to bring its law and
tariffs into compliance with the decision. If it fails to do so, then it must
enter into negotiations with the complaining country to determine mutually
acceptable compensation, such as pertinent tariff reductions.93 If the
defendant Member still fails to take action within twenty days, then the
complaining Member can ask the Dispute Settlement Body for the authority
to impose limited trade sanctions or retaliation in the form of suspending
concessions, or other obligations it has towards the defendant Member in
the same industrial sector.9
E. The Impact of the Dispute Resolution Process
A large proportion of WTO Panel and Appellate Body casework deals
with antidumping and CVD measures. The decisions, in particular those of
the Appellate Body, are long, highly detailed, and studied carefully by
scholars, attorneys, and regulative bodies. Although different mechanisms
are used to choose them, each decision is written by jurists from several
different country-members of the WTO, and since the majority of members
are from civil rather than common-law jurisdictions, the decisions are
crafted not with an eye towards precedential value, but instead with a
narrow understanding that their only job is to interpret the AD Agreement
and whether it was properly applied. Consequently, while these decisions
do not have the consistency that one would expect in a common law
jurisdiction, they do have a jurisprudential effect, and are highly influential.
For example, the 1916 Antidumping Act, the Byrd Amendment, certain
cotton subsidy provisions, and the U.S. steel safeguard measure were all
repealed or agreed to be scaled back 95 after the Appellate Body found them
9' Id. arts. 17(l)-(3).
92 Id. art. 21(3) ("At a DSB meeting held within thirty days after the date of adoption of
the panel or Appellate Body report, the Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its
intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.").
93 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 32, art. 22 (2).
94 Id. The justification for preferring retaliation within the same sector is that this
provides a limitation on the scope of the trade dispute between the affected parties and will
thereby prevent a wider trade war. However, some have criticized the effectiveness of such
sanctions. See, e.g., Holger Spamann, The Myth of 'Rebalancing' Retaliation in WTO
Dispute Settlement Practice, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 31, 34 (2006) (arguing that the sanction
measures as calculated and imposed are so imprecise as to be arbitrary); but see Daniel
Kalderimiss, Problems of WTO Harmonization and the Virtues of Shields over Swords, 13 J.
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305, 312 (2004) (acknowledging that when a Member faces
sanctions, it also faces immense international political pressure to resolve the WTO issue).
95 See 1916 Antidumping Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (2000) repealed by Pub. L. No. 108-429, §
2006(a), 118 Stat. 2597 (2004); see also Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000 ("The Byrd Amendment"), 19 U.S.C. § 1674(c) (2000) repealed by Pub. L. No. 109-
171 § 7601(a), 120 Stat. 154 (2006).
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to be inconsistent with the U.S. WTO obligations. 96 Initially, it was feared
that the hostility of most WTO member nations to U.S. antidumping
practices would result in decision after decision overturning U.S. decisions,
but that has not been the case.97 Instead, of a total of 115 WTO complaints
filed against the United States between 1995 and October 2006, the United
States prevailed on core issues in fourteen cases, lost in thirty cases, and the
rest are either inactive or incomplete. In terms of the seventy-nine
complaints filed by the United States, it prevailed in twenty-six complaints,
lost in four, and the rest were either resolved or became inactive.
98
Furthermore, even in the first few years, it was not only the United States
that had been found to have run afoul of the Antidumping Agreement, but
also Argentina, the European Union, Egypt, Guatemala, Mexico, and
Thailand.99 Nevertheless, the overall tenor of the decisions has been a
96 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-United States-Antidumping Act
of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R and Japan-United States-Antidumping Act of 1916,
WT/DS 1 62/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000); Raj Bhala, New WTO Antidumping Precedents Part II:
Causation, Injury Determinations, and Penalties, 6 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 980, 1012-17
(2002) (discussing the reports); Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping
and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu.e/217_234_abre.pdf (concerning
the Byrd Amendment). In addition to violating WTO obligations, the Byrd Amendment was
repealed as harmful to U.S. businesses because by subsidizing the cost of antidumping and
other trade remedy proceedings, it provided an incentive for more U.S. businesses to pursue
additional antidumping and subsidy complaints. See Letter from Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
Director of the Congressional Budget Office to Honorable Bill Thomas of the Comm. on
Ways and Means (Mar. 2, 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/5 Ixx/doc5130/03-
02-ThomasLetter.pdf. Furthermore, the law subsidized the output of some firms at the
expense of others, leading to inefficient use of capital, labor, and other economic resources,
discouraged settlement of cases, potentially interfered with the ability of U.S. exporters to
compete in the global marketplace, and left the United States vulnerable to retaliation against
its exports due to the negative Appellate Body finding. Id.; see also the accompanying
Economic Analysis of the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000. In contrast
to the flexibility of the Administration and Congress, however, the judiciary is more likely to
hold that Commerce is not bound by WTO Appellate Body decisions. See, e.g., Corus Staal
BC v. Dept. of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (under the Chevron
deference, holding that Commerce's habit of zeroing is reasonable, despite WTO
jurisprudence rejecting, and stating that WTO decisions are "not binding on the United
States, much less this court."); see also Paul Muller Industrie GnBH & Co. v. U.S., 435 F.
Supp. 2d 1241 (2006).
97 Richard 0. Cunningham, Commentary on the First Five Years of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement and Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 31 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 897, 901 (2000).
98 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SNAPSHOT OF WTO CASES INVOLVING THE
UNITED STATES (Aug. 22, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/
MonitoringEnforcement/DisputeSettlement/WlO/assetupload file957_5696.pdf.
99 Panel Report, Argentina-Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic
Floor Tiles from Italy, WT/DS189/R (Sept. 28, 2001); Panel Report, European
Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India,
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hypercritical, hyper-technical, narrow-scoped view of when an antidumping
measure is justifiably imposed.' 00  Typically, both the Panel and the
Appellate Body parse specific words of the Agreements closely,
scrutinizing the text at a micro-level, to the point that they have been
compared to biblical scholars attempting to determine how many angels can
dance on the head of a pin.101 For example, in determining whether the
United States had justifiably granted an antidumping duty on RAM
Semiconductors from Korea, the Panel examined the U.S. regulation stating
that an antidumping measure should not be imposed if the U.S. Commerce
Department found it "not likely" that the respondent would sell the
merchandise at less than fair value in the future.' 0 The Panel held that this
regulation was inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement requirement
that the agency question "whether the injury would be likely to continue to
recur if the duty were removed .... ,o3 In essence, the Panel held that "not
likely" to reoccur (cup half full) was so different from "likely" to reoccur
(cup half empty) that by imposing the antidumping duty, the United States
was in violation of the Antidumping Agreement104
While such decisions can be criticized as both hypercritical and
resulting in a good deal of confusion as to what antidumping regulations
will and will not pass WTO muster, their cumulative effect gives the
message that the Antidumping Agreement is a set of provisions to limit and
regulate antidumping measures, and not a permission slip to grant them.10 5
Thus, since the WTO panels and the Appellate Body view antidumping and
countervailing duties skeptically as limitations on the free flow of trade and
look for reasons to find an antidumping measure noncompliant, their
WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000); Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Anti-
Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar.
1, 2001); Panel Report, Egypt-Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from
Turkey, WT/DS2 11 /R (Aug. 8, 2002); Panel Report, Guatemala-Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS156/R (Oct. 24, 2000); Panel
Report, Mexico-Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the
United States, WT/DS 1 32/R (Jan. 28, 2000); Panel Report, Thailand-Anti-Dumping Duties
on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland,
WT/DS 122/R (Sept. 28, 2000); Appellate Body Report, Thailand-Anti-Dumping Duties on
Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland,
WT/DS122AB/R (Dec. 3, 2001).
10o Richard 0. Cunningham & Troy H. Cribb, Dispute Settlement Through the Lens of
'Free Flow of Trade', 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 155, 156 (2003).
'0' Id. at 156-57.
102 Id. at 157.
103 Panel Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access
Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabyte or Above from Korea, 6.58,
WT/DS/99/R (Jan. 29, 1999); see also Cunningham & Cribb, supra note 100, at 157.
104 Cunningham & Cribb, supra note 100, at 157.
'05 Id. at 159.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 28:215 (2008)
decisions are consistent with the WTO's underlying goal of encouraging
freer trade. 1
06
The prospect of imminent sanctions can exert immense political
pressure on the defendant Member to repeal trade remedies ruled to be in
violation of WTO rules by the Appellate Body. For example, on November
10, 2003, the Appellate Body found that the safeguard measures taken by
the United States on behalf of its steel industry were inconsistent with
Article XIX:l(a) of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards.,0 7
Sanctions were imposed, however, because the President of the United
States issued a proclamation terminating the safeguard measures subject to
the dispute within the applicable twenty-day period. 108
Pursuing an appeal, either through the WTO mechanism or through the
importing country's own mechanism, is not the only remedy a country or
affected importer can pursue when it objects to the imposition of an unfair
trade remedy. Studies indicate that countries may be resorting to "vigilante
justice" by imposing retaliatory remedies, possibly because they may be
less costly and provide more immediate results than does the WTO Dispute
Resolution process. 109
IV. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE REMEDIES LAW
A. Origination of Antidumping Laws
It has only been since the eighteenth century-since the Industrial
Revolution brought large-scale production and the active search for wider
markets-that subsidization of exports and dumping has been perceived to
be a problem. 110 In 1776, in the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith discussed
unfavorably the practice of granting bounties on exports.111 At first, the
106 Id. at 155 ("[A]II WTO Panel and Appellate Body ('AB') decisions have viewed
dispute settlement through the lens of the fundamental guiding principle, namely that the
raison d'etre of the WTO is to reduce (and if possible eliminate) barriers to the free flow of
trade.").
107 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain
Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS25 1/AB/R, WT/DS252/AB/R,
WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R, WT/DS259/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003)
(adopted Dec. 10, 2003).
108 Proclamation No. 7741, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,483 (Dec. 4, 2003).
109 Chad P. Bown, Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement:
Why Are So Few Challenged?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 515, 515 (2005).
110 JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 36 (University of
Chicago Press 1966) (1923).
111 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
bk. IV, ch. V (Edwin Cannan ed., University of Chicago Press 1976) (1776) ("I have known
the different undertakers of some particular works agree privately among themselves to give
a bounty out of their own pockets upon the exportation of a certain proportion of the goods
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purpose and effect of such bounties was to reduce the supply available for
the domestic market, and thereby raise domestic prices. Shortly afterward,
the aim shifted from raising domestic prices to disruption of competition in
the foreign market. Thus, originally such measures were predatory in
nature.
Because England was the first country to undergo the Industrial
Revolution, it is not surprising that the first extensive charges of dumping
were directed against its manufacturers." 2  For example, Alexander
Hamilton objected to the English government's bounties on the export of
sailcloth and linens, and described government-imposed export bounties as
the greatest obstacle encountered by new industries in a young United
States. He asserted that the export bounties were maintained in order "to
enable their [foreign government's] own workmen to undersell and supplant
all competitors in countries to which these commodities are sent."' His
published pleas for protection of American infant industries created such an
alarm that English manufacturers banded together to dump products on the
American market with the deliberate aim of crushing their American
competitors, thus increasing rather than decreasing dumping. 114
After the War of 1812, Americans again accused English
manufacturers of deliberately dumping their products with the aim of
crushing new industries." 5 In response to this threat, the U.S. Congress
passed a protectionist measure, the Tariff Act of 1816, stating: "The foreign
manufacturers and merchants will put in requisition all the powers of
ingenuity; will practice whatever art can devise and capital can accomplish
to prevent the American manufacturing establishments from taking root and
flourishing in their rich and native soil."'"16 However, by the latter part of
the nineteenth century, with the development of large-scale manufacturing
industries in other countries, complaints of English dumping diminished,
and dumping charges began to be directed against other countries, including
France, Germany, and the United States itself 7
By 1914, at the beginning of World War I, German industries
practiced export dumping more systematically than any other country. The
practice was facilitated by a high protective tariff and the almost complete
cartelization of large-scale industry in Germany, thus checking price
which they dealt in. This expedient succeeded so well that it more than doubled the price of
their goods in the home market, notwithstanding a very considerable increase in the
produce.").
112 id.
113 Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures, in STATE PAPERS AND
SPEECHES ON THE TARIFF 31, 32, 92-93 (Cambridge 1893).
114 VINER, supra note 110, at 38.
"' Id. at 39.
116 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 964 (1816).
117 VINER, supra note 110, at 48.
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competition in the domestic market. As a result, many of the German
cartels adopted definitive policies designed to maintain domestic prices at a
high level and to offset lower export prices by awarding bounties.' 18 The
cartels' primary objective was to maintain full production and stable and
profitable domestic prices, not necessarily to deliberately harm or destroy
industries in other lands. Export prices were set below domestic prices only
when needed to maintain aggregate sales and production capacity. Despite
this stated policy, however, dumping became the norm, rather than the
exception. 1
Because the remainder of the large industrialized nations of Europe did
not have large-scale manufacturing industries operating under unified
control as did Germany, and because they enjoyed high tariff protection at
home, export dumping was not present nearly to the same degree in
Belgium, France, or Austria, though Belgian industries which resorted more
or less systematically to dumping included the iron and steel, coal, cement,
plate glass, canned vegetables, and earthenware syndicates. 20  French
syndicates at times resorted to systematic dumping included iron and steel,
pig-iron, flax, hemp, and cotton-yarn, coal, and manufacturers of metal and
glass products. 21  Austrian industries sometimes resorted to export
dumping wire-tack, enameled ware, cotton-spinning, and petroleum-
refineries, as well as iron and steel. Thus, dumping and subsidization of
exports was common in large-scale industrialized nations up until World
War I.
Canada was the first country to adopt antidumping legislation in 1904,
followed by Australia in 1906.122 Several other nations followed in the
years up to 1920, with the United States enacting its first antidumping law
in 1916, and another in 1921.123 In the interval between World War I and
the 1950s, only a few more countries adopted antidumping laws, but they
became increasingly popular thereafter,124 increasing exponentially after the
creation of GATT and the WTO.
125
l18 See id. at 52-59.
119 Id. at 60.
120 Id. at 67.
121 Id. at 70.
122 IAN WOOTON & MAURIZIO ZANARDI, Antidumping versus Antitrust: Trade and
Competition Policy, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 385 (John
H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., University of Michigan Press 1990).
123 Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (2000), repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-
39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 193 (1979).
124 WOOTON & MAURIZIO ZANARDI, supra note 122, at 385.
2' See id. at 386.
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B. Development and Process of United States Antidumping Law
In the United States, the Sherman Antitrust Act was originally
promulgated in 1890 to combat trusts and other anticompetitive behavior,' 6
but the Supreme Court declared that its reach was limited to U.S. borders.
27
In this context, selling the same product at different prices in different
regions of the United States due to differences in the cost of manufacturing,
sale, or delivery is perfectly acceptable, unless its effect is to hinder or
destroy competition, in which case it is price discrimination in violation of
United States Antitrust laws. 28 Because the Sherman Act did not reach
non-U.S. actions, antidumping laws in the U.S. were originally developed
in the context of antitrust laws, in response to a perceived threat of dumping
by post-World War I Europe. 129 The concern was that dumped European
imports would harm American industries unable to marshal their resources
and lower their prices without facing bankruptcy.' 30  Thus, fearing
overwhelming competition from post-World War I Europe, Congress
passed the Antidumping Act of 1916, which subsequently became part of
antitrust law.131 The Antidumping Act provided a private right of action for
relief from "any person importing ... any articles ... into the United
States... at a price substantially less than the actual market value or
wholesale price ... at the time of exportation to the United States ....
In other words, private parties could sue "dumpers" directly for damage
done to their businesses, rather than going through an agency
administration.
Under the 1916 Act, the plaintiff had to prove predatory intent in
addition to dumping. 133  Because it proved to be nearly impossible for
126 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-5 (2000).
127 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) ("But the general and
almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.").
128 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000); see also VINER, supra note 110, at 3.
129 VINER, supra note 110.
130 Id.
131 15 U.S.C. § 72 (repealed 2004); Nicole DiSalvo, Note, Let's Dump the 1916
Antidumping Act: Why the 1994 GATT Provides Better Price Protection for U.S. Industries,
37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 791, 798 (2004); see also Dianne M. Keppler, Note, The Geneva
Steel Co. Decision Raises Concerns in Geneva: Why the 1916 Antidumping Act Violates the
WTO Antidumping Agreement, 32 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. & ECON. 293 (1999); Monica A.
Stump, Note, The Alarms Are Buzzing in Washington: The Antidumping Act of 1916 Returns
from Hibernation, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 645 (2002).
132 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 221 F.3d 924, 925 n.1 (6th Cir.
2000) (citing former 15 U.S.C. § 72).
"' 15 U.S.C. § 72 further required that "such act or acts be done with the intent of
destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of
an industry in the United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and
commerce in such articles in the United States." See also Stump supra note 131 at 654
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plaintiffs to provide evidence of predatory intent, in 1921 Congress
provided an alternative method, granting the executive branch statutory
authority to investigate and assess additional tariffs for dumping. 134 Unlike
the earlier act, the 1921 Act did not contain an intent requirement, making it
easier for plaintiffs to obtain relief because they only had to prove dumping
and injury. 135 Furthermore, the relief provided by the new antidumping act
was in the form of duties imposed on the imported product rather than
private damages as provided under the 1916 Act. As amended by the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979136 and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, it is
this framework that remains in effect. 137
After being ruled a violation of the WTO Antidumping Agreement, 138
the 1916 Antidumping Act was repealed in 2004.13' As indicated above,
even before its repeal, it was rarely used. Thus, in accordance with WTO
agreements, the 1921 Act, as recast in 1930 and revised in 1994, is now the
sole remedy for dumping in the United States. It does not provide
petitioners with any private remedy, but in accord with WTO strictures,
allows the International Trade Commission of the U.S. Government to
impose additional duties above and beyond the ones delineated in the WTO
schedule. 140  These additional duties are collected and kept by the U.S.
Treasury. The 2000 Byrd Amendment provided that the sums collected
would be redistributed to petitioners to offset the costs incurred in pursuing
the action. However, like the 1916 Act, the WTO found the Byrd
amendment to be non-compliant, and it has subsequently been repealed.'
1
(discussing commentary disagreeing over whether or not the plaintiff must prove intent to
decrease competition or create or a monopoly).
134 Geneva Steel Co. v. Ranger Supply Corp, 980 F. Supp. 1209, 1215 (D. Utah 1997);
Keppler, supra note 131, at 296.
135 Christopher M. Barbuto, Note, Toward Convergence of Antitrust and Trade Law: An
International Analogue to Robinson-Patman, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 2047, 2068 (1994).
136 S. REP. No. 96-249, at 16, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADM. NEWS, at
381; see also Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2501 (1994).
117 H.R. REP. NO. 103-826, pts. I & II, and Statement of Administrative Action, reprinted
in 1994 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADM. NEWS, at 3773; see 19 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).
138 Appellate Body Report, United States-Antidumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136,
162/AB/R (Mar. 31, 2000) (adopted Sept. 26, 2000).
139 Act of Dec. 3, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-429, tit. II, § 2006(a), repealed by 118 Stat.
2597.
140 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2007) (setting forth the requirements for an antidumping
action). See also H.R. REP. No. 103-826, supra note 137; 19 U.S.C. § 2502 (2007) (adopting
the freer trade goals of the WTO: "The purposes of this Act are-(1) to approve and
implement the trade agreements negotiated under the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2101];
(2) to foster the growth and maintenance of an open world trading system; (3) to expand
opportunities for the commerce of the United States in international trade; and (4) to improve
the rules of international trade and to provide for the enforcement of such rules, and for other
purposes.").
141 See supra note 95.
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Under current U.S. antidumping law, one agency determines whether
dumping has occurred, while another determines whether the U.S. industry
has sustained a material injury (or threat thereof). 142 In keeping with the
procedures delineated by the WTO Antidumping Agreement, an industry
participant files an antidumping petition simultaneously with the U.S.
Department of Commerce ("DOC") and the U.S. International Trade
Commission ("ITC"). Within forty-five days of filing, the DOC must
determine whether there is a "reasonable basis to believe or suspect" that
dumping has occurred, and the ITC must determine if there is a "reasonable
indication" of a material injury or threat thereof to the U.S. industry. 143 The
purpose of these two preliminary investigations is to eliminate frivolous
cases, spare foreign importers unsubstantiated harassment, and conserve the
U.S. government's financial resources.
144
If the preliminary determinations are negative, the case is
terminated, 145 but if not, then as an interim measure, the foreign producer
must post a bond or deposit money to cover any duties that may be
imposed. 146 After a full investigation, if the DOC and ITC make a final
determination that dumping has occurred and a U.S. industry was either
materially injured or threatened with material injury, then an antidumping
duty order is imposed on the foreign producer equal to the dumping
margin. 147
As previously indicated, as there is no intent requirement, the motive
of the seller in dumping the product is inconsequential. 48 In fact, dumping
is usually a result of oversupply and has nothing to do with predatory
pricing. The enhanced duties are applied prospectively, and serve
ostensibly to protect U.S. industry by forcing the foreign producer to 1)
raise the selling price of the good in the United States to incorporate the
heightened duty or 2) withdraw from the U.S. market to avoid payment of
the new duties. 4 9 As the motive of the seller is inconsequential, one can no
longer argue that dumping is generally the result of deliberate, predatory
behavior on the part of another country, with the aim of destroying a
domestic industry. The only concern is whether by trading at "less than
142 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006) (The U.S. Department of Commerce is the administering
authority that determines if dumping is present); 19 U.S.C. § 1673b (2006) (The
International Trade Commission ("ITC") determines if there is material injury).
141 9 U.S.C. §§ 1673a-b (2006).
144 Hale E. Sheppard, The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment): A Defeat Before the WTO May Constitute an Overall Victory for U.S. Trade,
10 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 121,123 (2002).
"41 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(3) (2006).
146 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (2006).
147 Sheppard, supra note 144, at 146.
148 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
149 Id.
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normal value," the foreign importer is injuring the domestic industry, and
the logical result is that prices for the affected products remain at the pre-
existing U.S. level, rather than being challenged by the cheaper imports.
Thus, antidumping duties serve to protect domestic competitors, not to
protect competition. U.S. agency procedures for CVD actions parallel
antidumping procedures, as would be expected. 50 Safeguards actions have
more stringent requirements, and the ultimate decision of whether or not to
impose a safeguard is left with the President, not a governmental agency.
15 1
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF TRADE REMEDIES REPORTED TO
THE WTO
A. WTO Annual Committee Reports
One of the best (and only) reliable source of statistics on the number of
trade remedies are the annual reports issued by the pertinent WTO
Committees: under each of the three Agreements, members are required to
report the number of remedy measures initiated and put in place on a
biannual basis. 52 Although the WTO admits that the reports are not always
accurate, 53 to the extent that most member countries attempt to report
accurately, the numbers are indicative of trends.
1. Safeguards Remedies
As shown in Graph 1 below, reporting of safeguard initiations started
only in 1998, when nineteen initiations were reported worldwide. In 2006,
that number had dropped to fourteen initiations, all by developed and
developing countries, with none by least-developed countries.
Interestingly, in 1998 the number of initiations in developed countries
outnumbered those initiated in developing countries (11:8), but by 2006,
those numbers were reversed (4:10). There was a worldwide spike in 2000,
when forty-seven safeguard remedies were initiated.
150 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2000); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.101 (2000).
151 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
152 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ANTIDUMPING ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND AROUND
THE WORLD: AN UPDATE vii (June 2001), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfrn?index
=2895&type=0.
153 See, e.g., Antidumping Committee Report, supra note 42, at 2 (indicating that 70
members failed to submit semi-annual notifications).
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five measures worldwide (four in developed countries, one in a developing
country) in 1998, as compared to eleven in 2006 (three in developed
countries, eight in developing), with a similar spike of twenty in 2000. No
matter which way it is measured, there is no significant increase over the
eight-year period in the number of safeguard remedies either filed or in
place. The number of safeguards actions remains extremely low as
compared to anti-subsidies and antidumping actions, probably because
safeguards actions require a higher level of proof, present more risks for the
domestic government, and are less likely to be granted.1 54 Nevertheless,
there was a spike in the number of safeguard actions in 2000.
2. Countervailing Duties Remedies
Comparison of Initiations of Countervailing Duty Action and
Measures for Developed, Developing, and Least-Developed
Countries
35






As shown in Graph 3, there were a total of seventeen CVD initiations
in 1998, thirteen in developed countries and four in developing countries.
After a spike of twenty-five in 2001, by 2006, the number had dropped
precipitously to a total of four filed in developed countries.
154 See infra Part V.B. for additional discussion.
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In terms of measures in force, Graph 4 shows that in 1995 there were a
total of 128 (124 in developed countries, four in developing countries). The
number dwindled thereafter, with 105 in 2000 and seventy-nine in 2006
(seventy-three in developed countries, six in developing countries).
3. Antidumping Remedies
As predicted in 1997, antidumping measures have become the
predominant form of trade remedy. 155 In 1995, Graph 5 shows a total of
126 initiations-ninety in developed countries, and thirty-six in developing
countries. By 2006, developing countries were responsible for a much
higher percentage of the initiations: out of a total of 163 initiations, seventy-
six were in developing countries, and eighty-seven were in developed
countries. As with safeguards initiations, there was a spike in 2001 of a
total of 313 initiations.
155 Corr, supra note 42, at 66-68.
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Measures in force, as demonstrated in Graph 6, show a similar pattern
of increasing numbers in developing countries. In 1995, out of a total of
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developing countries. By 2006, the total number had grown to 1,402
measures, with 1,099 in developed countries and 404 in developing
countries. Rather than a spike in 2001, the numbers increased beginning in
1999 to approximately 1,300 measures, continued to increase through 2004,
and have decreased for the past two years.
B. Reasons for Disproportionate Number of Antidumping Measures
Safeguards are the least used remedy, for logical reasons. From a
petitioner's perspective, although they involve a faster timeframe than
antidumping or countervailing duty measures, they require a higher level of
proof and provide only temporary relief in diminishing amounts.
156
Furthermore, because CVD actions generally result in significantly lower
duties than antidumping investigations, they are less protective of domestic
industries and therefore less attractive.' 5 7 Furthermore, because they apply
to all imports, they are more likely to be objected to by other countries, and
therefore are riskier in the eyes of the domestic governmental agency.
In comparison to both anti-subsidy and safeguards proceedings,
antidumping measures are much more attractive to potential petitioners. To
begin with, because of the intricacy of the calculations involved, the
calculation of normal value can be tilted towards a finding of dumping.
158
It is relatively easy to file a successful antidumping complaint targeting
specific competitors, and a successful complaint is likely to lead to duties
that have a direct and sustained price effect on specific merchandise.'5 9
Although WTO rules stipulate a sunset review after five years, in the United
States the perception has been that it was unlikely that a sunset review
would result in revocation of the original order.
160
In fact, however, any such perception may be inaccurate because the
first time the WTO-mandated U.S. sunset review procedures were utilized,
in 2000, almost half of the antidumping measures reviewed were revoked:
the Commerce Department revoked fifty-seven antidumping orders and
continued seventy-two (thus revoking 57 out of 129 or 44% of the measures
reviewed). 16 1 This was an unusually large number because it was the first
156 Id. at 72.
151 Id. at 73.
158 RICHARD WRIGHT, Validity of Antidumping Remedies-Some Thoughts, in
ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 425, 451 (John H. Jackson &
Edwin A. Vermulst eds., University of Michigan Press 1990).
159 Corr, supra note 42, at 74.
160 Cunningham, supra note 97, at 900.
161 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2005 TRADE POLICY AND
2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROGRAM 266 (2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Reports
_Publications/2005/2005_TradePolicy.Agenda/SectionIndex.html.
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year the sunset review measure was utilized. Nevertheless, there still seems
to be a good chance that a measure will be revoked at its sunset review.
162
Apparently, the chances of revocation are better if the respondent
participates actively in the review. There is now some showing that import
producers may choose to invest more in a sunset review than in the initial
response, possibly as a consequence of these statistics.1
63
VI. CRITICISM LEVELED AT TRADE REMEDIES
The criticism of unfair trade actions is broad, and takes issue with
calculation methodology, underlying policies, and consequent effects.
Some critics argue that inaccuracies in the methodology make
determinations of the margin of dumping inaccurate and unreliable.
164
Others argue that the proceedings are so expensive that the remedies are
effectively unavailable in small developing countries or to small, emerging
industries. Some claim that the United States and other developed countries
are using antidumping measures too widely, or are targeting certain
countries. 65 Still others argue that antidumping remedies have been used
by U.S. entities to attack infant industries in least developed countries
specifically developed with U.S. funds to import into U.S. markets, thus
making the United States seem both hypocritical and protectionist. 166 A
more fundamental line of criticism argues that unfair trade measures are by
nature protectionist, ineffective, and undermine the concept of free trade
and open markets. 167  For purposes of discussion, five categories of
162 See id. (reporting that in 2004, twelve out of twenty-nine orders reviewed were
revoked).
163 See TIMOTHY C. BRIGHTBILL, LINDA S. CHANG & PEGGY CLARKE, INTERNATIONAL
PRACTIONER'S DESKBOOK SERIES: TRADE REMEDIES FOR GLOBAL COMPANIES 103 (ABA
Publishing 2006) (discussing respondent companies' need to consider how to direct
resources with regard to responding to both questionnaires and sunset reviews).
64 See, e.g., BRINK LINDSEY & DAN IKENSON, REFORMING THE ANTIDUMPING
AGREEMENT: A ROAD MAP FOR WTO NEGOTIATIONS 14-20 (Cato Institute 2002) (listing
criticisms of normal value calculations).
165 See, e.g., Lei Yu, Rule of Law or Rule of Protectionism: Anti-dumping Practices
Toward China and the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 293, 326-
32, 339-40 (2002) (arguing that U.S. calculations of constructed normal value for Chinese
imports is outdated and based on misinformation, and implying that large number of
antidumping proceedings brought in the United States against China indicates a general
discriminatory intent).
166 See, e.g., Kenneth Harrell, Fables of Global Capitalism: Antidumping and Vietnamese
Catfish, 28 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 439, 440 (2004) (pointing out that the U.S. antidumping
action at issue was especially disturbing because the very government preventing the export
of Vietnamese catfish initially encouraged its cultivation for export).
167 See, e.g., Ehrenhaft & Meriwether, supra note 36, at 1114-16 (1984) (arguing that
antidumping laws have never significantly promoted their stated purposes, have not
enhanced the health of the U.S. economy, and give the very industries most in need of
modernization and adaptation a means of sheltering themselves from market forces); see also
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criticism will be discussed: "unfair trade remedy" as a misnomer,
inaccuracies in calculation of dumping and injury, high cost of trade remedy
actions, trade remedies as contra to the free market, and trade remedies as
encouraging cartelization.
A. "Unfair Trade Remedy" is a Misnomer: Predatory Intent is a Fiction
Antidumping laws were originally justified as a remedy to counter
unfair trade in the form of predatory pricing: the foreign producer was
allegedly intentionally underselling the local competition in order to force it
out of business. However, predatory pricing has been widely recognized as
a myth because the predator must sustain a significant loss for long enough
time to force his competition out of business, and then must maintain a
monopoly for a long enough time to be able to raise prices and regain its
loss. 1 8 In fact, dumping is most commonly a result of oversupply, and
rarely involves predation. It has little or nothing in common with unfair
trade or antitrust law.
Though they are commonly referred to as remedies for unfair trade,
"nowhere in the WTO Agreements is it explained that there is such a thing
as 'unfair trade' or why 'unfair trade' should be disciplined as something
inconsistent with our counterproductive to the WTO's basic formula of
encouraging freer trade by substantially reducing tariffs and other
barriers."'169 Unfair trade law (as opposed to trade remedies) began in the
United States in 1890 with passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the
Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act") in 1914."l' The Sherman
Antitrust Act was designed to outlaw collusive behavior, specifically to
break up trusts and monopolies that avoid or distort market-place
competition by setting industry prices. Such examples include the forced
break-up of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey' 72 (a trust founded by
John D. Rockefeller), as well as the break-up of AT&T.'7
LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 164, at viii (arguing that the Antidumping Agreement allows
wide scope for protectionist abuses, and acts as a major loophole in the free-trade disciplines
of the world trading system).
168 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 587-90 (1986).
169 See Cunningham & Cribb, supra note 100, at 155.
170 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
171 Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)(2006)).
172 Standard Oil Co. ofN.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
173 United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd
mem., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1005-06 (1983) (approving dismissal
pursuant to settlement between Department of Justice and AT&T). Through a settlement,
Microsoft narrowly avoided such a break-up in the United States, United States v. Microsoft,
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert.denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001), though it faced a substantial
penalty in Europe. Commission Decision of 24 Mar. 2004 (Case COMP/C-3/37.792
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Additionally, the FTC Act, like the Sherman Antitrust Act, is focused
on perceived evils in the marketplace by declaring unlawful: "Unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce." '17 4 The FTC Act's legislative
history indicates that "unfair methods of competition" was intended to
prohibit practices regarded as against public morals but not previously
recognized as unlawful, as well as those already unlawful under common
law or equity. 75  Conduct prohibited as "unfair" under the FTC Act
includes behavior such as concealing a business relationship with a
purported competitor,176 using misleading labels on goods,177 instigating
misleading media reports or vexatious litigation against a competitor,178
using bribes or other financial inducements to persuade a distributor to
discontinue carrying competing products, 179 or using espionage techniques
to obtain the names of a competitor's customers.1 8°- Thus, "unfair" under
the FTC Act does not simply mean selling at a lower price. In fact, the
whole point of protecting competition is to encourage lower prices and
better products for consumers.
Over its history, the interpretation of the FTC Act has varied: first, it
broadened out of concern for the consumer protection policies of the
1960s. "'81 Then, like the antitrust legislation, it narrowed in the 1980s out of
Microsoft), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions
/37792/en.pdf.
174 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). See also David L. Belt, The Standard for Determining
"Unfair Acts of Practices" Under State Unfair Trade Practices Acts, 80 CoNN. B.J. 247,
249-54 (2006) (discussing the history of how the FTC Act has been interpreted).
175 51 CONG. REc. 11112 (daily ed. June 25, 1914) (statement of Sen. Francis Newlands);
51 CONG. REc. 12981 (daily ed. July 30, 1914) (statement of Sen. George Sutherland).
176 See FTC v. St Louis Lightning Rod Co., 3 F.T.C. 327, 336 (1921); FTC v. A.A. Berry
Seed Co., 2 F.T.C. 427, 440 (1920); FTC v. Armour & Co., 1 F.T.C. 430, 435 (1919).
177 FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922).
178 Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673, 682 (8th Cir. 1926).
179 Hastings Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 253 (6th Cir. 1946).
180 The FTC's interpretation of its "unfair trade" mandate broadened in 1964 with the
Commission's statement of the "Cigarette Rule Standard." FTC v. Oakes Co., 3 F.T.C. 36,
41(1920).
181 "No enumeration of examples can define the outer limits of the Commission's
authority to proscribe unfair acts of practices, but the examples should help to indicate the
breadth and flexibility of the concept of unfair acts and practices and to suggest the factors
that determine whether a particular act or practice should be forbidden on this ground. These
factors are as follows: (1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the
common law, or otherwise whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of
some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen)." Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and
Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325,
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free market concerns.' 82 As opposed to the consumer protection concerns
of the 1960s, U.S. government policy in the 1980s demonstrated a stronger
regard for the marketplace as self-correcting, and a stronger reliance on
consumers' wisdom in choosing desirable alternatives and avoiding those
that are undesirable. 183  Today, FTC regulation of unfair trade remains
comparatively narrow and market-friendly. Consequently, firms often price
their products differently in different markets and sell below cost
(respectively referred to as "price discrimination" and "predatory pricing"
in antitrust terms). However, these practices generally do not run afoul of
FTC or antitrust laws. In fact, non-predatory price discrimination and sales
below cost are relatively common.
Firms commonly sell products at prices below their full costs of
production. For example, many firms lose money during recessions,
which means by definition that they are selling at prices that are
below their costs. The introduction of a new product may also lead
to below-cost sale. Many new products lose money for a period until
demand reaches amounts that can be produced efficiently and the
producing firm learn through experience the most efficient way to
produce those products. A further example is the use of so-called
loss leaders in retail sales. Loss leaders are products that a store puts
on sale at very low prices to attract customers into the store, with the
hope that customers will see and purchase other, higher-priced
products. 5
While some may question the justifiability of antitrust law, 186 in both
antitrust and unfair trade law, the focus is on preserving competition in a
free marketplace, rather than protecting competitors. In contrast, the focus
in trade remedy law is on protecting domestic competitors.
Antidumping petitioners are in reality complaining not about any
predatory intent or unfairness, but about the fact that the foreign competitor
is under-pricing them. Thus, they are asking to be protected from
competition. Countervailing duty petitioners have a stronger argument:
they are arguing that the foreign competitor's low price distorts the market
8355 (July 2, 1964) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. 408). The FTC's rule concerning cigarette
advertising, codified at 16 C.F.R. 408, was preempted by Congress's Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 283 (1965), which
prohibited the FTC from further regulating cigarette labeling.
182 See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94
Stat. 374 (1984) (Congress narrowed the scope).
183 See Belt, supra note 174, at 264-67.
184 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 152, at 3.
85 Id. at n.10.
186 See, e.g., Block & Gries, supra note 35.
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because it is the result of a governmental subsidy. 187 Safeguards petitioners
acknowledge that they simply cannot compete against any foreign
competitors, and are asking for relief. Thus, all trade remedies are aimed at
protecting domestic competitors, not competition-a result diametrically
opposed to both the WTO's freer trade policy and U.S. antitrust policy.
Because unfair trade remedies do not have the strong moral component
of some laws-they are not intended to right any wrongful act-and
because they are inconsistent with the GATTAVTO principle of freer trade,
some have suggested that unfair trade remedies be replaced by an
international antitrust law. 188 However, this does not address the political
and practical pressures that can force a country to adopt an unfair trade
measure in the first place. A developing country may want to protect an
infant industry that employs a significant number of its citizens, so that it
can become competitive. 189 And in a developed country such as the United
States, a government may face tremendous political pressure from major
industry players.' 90 In either case, a government may be called upon by its
citizens to protect its borders-and it can be argued that a government's
primary duty is to protect its borders (though admittedly from invading
marauders, not marauding imports). The issue then becomes whether the
protection provided under the WTO exceptions is intellectually viable or
worthwhile. A number of critics say no on both accounts.
B. Inaccurate and Grotesquely Complicated Methodology in Dumping and
Injury Calculations
In addition to criticizing trade remedies (particularly antidumping) as
based on a fictional wrong, critics have taken issue with the methodology of
calculating dumping margins and injuries. The critics argue that it is highly
inaccurate and lends itself to manipulation.' 91 The WTO rules require that
the determination of dumping and injury be made on a sound factual basis,
187 See discussion infra Part VII.C.
188 See, e.g., Ehrenhafl & Meriwether, supra note 36, at 1151; see also Eleanor M. Fox,
Remedies and the Courage of Convictions in a Globalized World: How Globalization
Corrupts Relief 80 TuL. L. REv. 571 (2005) (advocating the use of restraint by national
authorities with overlapping jurisdiction in antitrust cases involving multinational
companies).
189 See infra text accompanying notes 245-47.
190 See Ehrenhaft & Meriwether, supra note 36, at 1115 ("This article contends that there
is no convincing evidence that the laws, even when properly used, do any measurable good.
... Their history reflects a consistent congressional effort, at the constant urging of certain
powerful sectors of U.S. industry and labor, to protect U.S. industries against import
competition.").
191 See, e.g., LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 164; Cunningham, supra note 97, at 898
(indicating that the Department of Commerce has adopted a number of interpretations
tending to increase the dumping margin).
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but getting accurate numbers is difficult, and the process is necessarily
complex. Assume that the applicant is a U.S. company. The applicant
company submits its own numbers and must see that enough of his U.S.
competitors do so as well to reach the requisite 25% of U.S. production.
The company also, however, must present numbers for the importer and for
the importing country's industry. Those extra-territorial numbers are
collected by the economists the company hires to study the industry in the
importing country, about which information may be scarce or unreliable.
The applicant's government then sends questionnaires to the importers
identified in the petition, and asks them directly for their numbers. If the
importers choose not to reply, then the applicant's government may use the
self-serving "best available" numbers submitted by the applicant. If the
companies choose to reply, then they have to provide accounting of a sort
that they would never do for normal business purposes, based on direct
expenses applied precisely on a sale-by-sale or customer-by-customer
basis.192 This involves a painstaking recalculation of product costs. 9 3 The
more applicants and respondents there are, the greater the chance that one
or more will submit inaccurate numbers. Assume, for the sake of argument,
a 2% inaccuracy in each of five separate submissions from applicants and
respondents-that amounts to a 10% inaccuracy overall. A 2% dumping
margin is considered de minimus, therefore, any inaccuracy in the initial
numbers submitted will be magnified in the resulting calculation. This
potential inaccuracy occurs even before calculating in any changes in
exchange rates that took place during the period in question, which further
complicates matters and increases the likelihood of error. Furthermore,
national authorities have substantial discretion to adjust an exporter's
reported full costs, particularly where the exporter has departed from its
normal accounting system. 194 This further calls into question the accuracy
and comparability of the data used to make the myriad calculations required
in a trade remedy case.
1. Dumping Calculations
The process of determining whether a product has been dumped has
been termed "grotesque[ly]" complicated. 95  The first concern in a
dumping calculation is determining the like product, and even if the product
sold in the home market shows some similarities with the exported product,
the exercise often becomes one of comparing apples and oranges. As one
critic describes:
192 Corr, supra note 42, at 80.
'9' Id. at 81.
194 Id. at 82.
195 Ehrenhart & Meriwether, supra note 36, at 113 1.
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In the typical antidumping investigation, the DOC compares home-
market and U.S. prices of physically different goods, in different
kinds of packaging, sold at different times, in different and
fluctuating currencies, to different customers at different levels of
trade, in different quantities, with different freight and other
movement costs, different credit terms, and other differences in
directly associated selling expenses (e.g., commissions, warranties,
royalties, and advertising). Is it any wonder that the prices aren't
identical?
196
Even accepting that apples-to-oranges comparisons are inherently
invalid, several estimations made in the calculation of normal value and the
dumping margin further increase the likelihood of inaccurate results. The
United States defines dumping as the sale of a commodity in an export
market at a price less than "normal value."'1 97 Similarly, the WTO defines it
as either "international price discrimination," or "export pricing at levels
below the cost of production plus a reasonable amount for selling, general
and administrative expenses, and profit." (i.e. "normal value"). 198 Under
either terminology, dumping occurs when the product as exported is sold at
a price lower than the one for which it is normally sold at home: the price
per unit in the exporter's home market ("foreign market price") minus the
export price per unit. The extent of dumping ("dumping margin") is then
calculated by dividing the difference by the export price. Thus, if a foreign
producer sells widgets for $10 at home and for $8 in the United States, then
its dumping margin is 25%.199
Even if a product is sold in the home market, it can be difficult to
determine its price. There may be (and usually are) several prices used in
both markets, so usually a weighted average price of home market sales is
compared to either a weighted average of the export sales or to export sales
on a transaction-by-transaction basis.200 The highest home market price is
excluded from the U.S. calculation (thus making it less likely that the
exported price is lower than the adjusted home price, making a dumping
finding less likely), but even so, getting accurate numbers concerning the
sales and prices of a product in another country is problematic, and that is
assuming that a like product is sold to a like market at a like period of time
in the home country. Furthermore, the United States has practiced
196 L1NDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 164, at 21.
197 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006).
198 Communication from the United States to the VTO Negotiating Group on Rules,
Basic Concepts and Principles of the Trade Remedy Rules, TN/RL/W/27 (Oct. 22, 2002),
available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/press2002/1017%20basicconcepts.html.
199 LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 164, at 1.
200 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 32, art 2.1; see also Raj Bhala & David A.
Gantz, WTO Case Review 2004, 22 ARdz. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 99, 116-17 (2005) (discussing
zeroing).
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"zeroing" in deciding which of a number of prices to use in calculating an
average price. 20 1  In other words, it has ignored instances of negative
dumping margins where the U.S. price is higher than the home-market
price, thus skewing the calculation back in favor of finding dumping. °2
Even assuming an accurate average home market price, dumping
calculations can be inaccurate, showing dumping where there is none.
Assume that the per capita income in the home country is significantly
lower than that in the importing country. Thus, even if the same product,
say a Hi-Def TV set, is sold for the same price (but for reasonable
expenses), that price will be prohibitively expensive at home but attractive
overseas. In such cases, the manufacturer will be motivated to lower the
home price as much as possible, counting on making up the difference
through a higher export price-the opposite of dumping.
If, however, the local economy takes a downturn and the manufacturer
finds that the home market has dried up but the manufacturer has a
substantial amount of product on hand, it may leave the home price as is
and lower the manufacturer's export price as much as possible until the
surplus is sold. In such a case, the result would be that the home price is
higher than the export price, and thus the product is "dumped," even though
the total profit the manufacturer receives is the same or less than he would
have received had his home market been healthy. The "normal value" on
which the dumping margin is calculated is not normal for the home market.
Very often, however, there are little or no sales of like product in the
home market, in which case, the export price-the second definition-must
be used. Normal value is then calculated by subtracting certain costs from
the export price in a third country. Similarly, a surrogate country is also
used in calculation of normal value when the imported product is from a
non-market economy.20 3 The choice of a third country is quite problematic.
201 The WTO has found that zeroing in transaction-to-transaction calculations is not in
compliance with the strictures of the Antidumping Agreement. See Appellate Body Report,
United States-Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada,
WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 31, 2004). Nor is it in compliance in average-to-average
calculations, Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001), and in
sunset reviews, Appellate Body Report, United States-Sunset Review of AD Duties on
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, 135, 162, WT/DS244/AB/R
(Jan. 9, 2004).
202 LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 164, at 70.
203 In such a case, because market forces are not considered to be functioning properly in
non-market economies, the DOC determines normal value by analyzing data from a
surrogate country that (1) produces a significant amount of similar merchandise, and (2) is at
a comparable level of economic development. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(2)
(1994). The DOC recognizes that China has "pockets" of competition, but presumes that
any particular Chinese product is one from a non-market economy unless the respondents
prove otherwise. The use of the analog price based on data from a surrogate is highly
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The United States generally requires that the third country must be similar
in size and population to the home country.2 °4 The argument then becomes
that if the price at which the product is sold in the plaintiff importing
country is less than that at which the product is sold in the third country,
then there is "international price discrimination," or dumping. The same
inaccuracies that apply to home market costs apply with regard to export
price costs, though amplified, because the vagaries of assuming that market
conditions in a third country are similar to those in the importing country.
Furthermore, for example, there is nothing inherently unfair about selling
widgets produced in China at a lower price in the United States than in
Japan. Thus, the ironic result is that a U.S. manufacturer can lawfully
practice price discrimination (selling the same product at different prices in
different markets), but a non-U.S. company doing the same thing on an
international level can be subjected to a dumping penalty.20 5
Finally, if there is neither a home price nor an export price, or if the
export price is unreliable, then a constructive export price may be used.206
In these cases, instead of the foreign market price, a constructive normal
value is used: either the "cost of production plus a reasonable amount ... "
or a comparable price as exported to an appropriate third country.20 7
Logically, using a home market price is a more accurate determination of
the existence of dumping than is a constructive export price, and a
constructive export price, at best, can only be an estimate of whether or not
the product is being dumped. The constructive export price is even further
from reality than either the normal value or the export price in a third
country. One would assume that export price and constructive export price
are rarely used due to their inherent inaccuracies, but this is not the case. In
one study of 141 U.S. antidumping proceedings, strict comparisons of U.S.
and home-market prices were used in only four determinations-thus using
a strict country-to-country comparison is the exception, not the rule.20
8
controversial, especially as China is often the target of antidumping actions. Lei Yu, Rule of
Law or Rule of Protectionism: Antidumping Practices Toward China and the WTO Dispute
Settlement System, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 295, 310 (2002); see also Patricia H. Piskorski, A
Dangerous Discretionary "Duty": U.S. Antidumping Policy Toward China, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 595 (2005) (discussing problems of non-market economy calculations with regard to
China).
204 See U.S. Department of Commerce, Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Petition
Counseling and Analysis Unit, Glossary, http://www.ia.ita.doc.gov/pcp/pcp-glossary.html
(last visited Mar. 8, 2008) (defining "Comparison Market" and "Constructed Export Price
Offset").
205 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
206 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 32, art. 2.5.
207 See id. art. 2.2. Rules for calculating administrative, selling, and general costs and
profits are given in arts. 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2.
208 LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 164, at 25.
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2. Injury Calculations
In addition to showing that dumping exists, the governmental agency
must determine that the domestic industry is materially injured or
threatened with material injury, and must prove a causal connection
between the dumping and that injury before antidumping duties may be
imposed. However, critics argue that there are no clear standards for
judging whether there is a causal link between the two: "Any coincidence of
significant or rising imports and poor industry performance can serve as the
basis for imposing antidumping remedies."' °  In the United States, the
European Union, and India, the usual approach is a bifurcated analysis.2 1 °
The governmental agency first determines whether a domestic industry is
injured and next determines whether the subject imports constitute "a
cause" of that injury. The argument against this approach is that there is no
standardized, articulated method of linking the loss suffered by the affected
industry to the imported product, and not some other cause: assuming the
domestic industry is doing poorly, import volumes are up and prices down,
then it is always possible for the agency to find that the imports made at
least some contribution and thus make an affirmative determination.2 ' In
addition to establishing causation only through a weak association, this
approach has been found by the WTO Appellate Body to violate the
Antidumping Agreement which requires a closer link between dumping and
a determination of injury, especially as it specifies that all other factors
contributing to the injury be identified.2 12
C. High Cost of Unfair Trade Actions
Acting as a petitioner in an antidumping, countervailing duty, or
safeguards case is expensive 213: costs of a modest case exceed a million
dollars in the United States.2 14 Merely preparing the petition and supporting
documents in an antidumping, CVD, or safeguard case is inordinately
209 Id. at 178.
210 Prakash Narayanan, Injury Investigations in "Material Retardation " Antidumping
Cases, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus., 37, 51-53 (2004).
211 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, International Trade and Unfair Imports: Price
Discrimination and Predation Analysis in Antitrust and International Trade: A Comment, 61
U. CIN. L. REV. 877 (1993); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of 'Injury' in Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Cases, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (Jagdeep
S. Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997).
212 Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS162/AB/R
(Sept. 26, 2000) (complaint by Japan); see also Antidumping Agreement, supra note 32, art.
3.5; Richard D. Boltuck & Seth Kaplan, Conflicting Entitlements: Can Antidumping and
Antitrust Regulation Be Reconciled?, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 903, 906-07 (1993).
213 See Sheppard, supra note 44, at 121; Ehrenhaft & Meriwether, supra note 36, at 1136.
214 INTERNATIONAL PRACTITIONER'S DESKTOP SERIES: TRADE REMEDIES FOR GLOBAL
COMPANIES 19 (Timothy Brightbill, Linda Chang & Peggy Clarke eds., 2007).
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expensive, in part because they are lengthy and must be submitted in
multiple copies. In addition to legal costs of final preparation, filing, and
advocacy, the collection and analysis of the factual information required for
two industries (domestic and foreign), as well as the calculation of dumping
margin and material injury requires hefty payments to accountants, policy
analysts, industry experts, and economic advisors.2 15 And this doesn't even
include the in-house accounting costs. Consequently, as the price of such
participation continues to increase, small and incipient industries in the
United States are unable to gather sufficient resources to defend their
market share, a result which some find reflects "poorly on the laws
involved. , 21 6 Governments of least developed countries may not even have
the resources to implement unfair trade laws, let alone the resources needed
to pursue such actions.
Unfair trade actions are costly not just for the petitioner, but also for
the other parties involved: the respondent foreign competitors, the
petitioner's government, as well as the applicants. Merely responding to
the questionnaire sent by the petitioner's government's agency (which
average more than seventy pages long) 21 requires substantial legal,
economist, and accounting fees. Defending against the application is even
more costly, as it is in a jurisdiction foreign to the defendant, so attorneys
who are experts in this field must be hired in the foreign jurisdiction. If a
respondent competitor chooses not to respond, then the agency is likely to
impose duties based on the best available information (i.e., the self-serving
numbers supplied by the petitioner).1 8 Tactically, then, a respondent
industry can decide whether the foreign market is worth the expense of the
defense, how much of a defense it is feasible to bring (merely responding to
the questionnaire or fighting the additional duty through to the WTO), or
whether it will instead withdraw and wait for the sunset review to fight the
219
measure--or it could file a retaliatory petition at home.
The process is also expensive for the applicant's government, which
must have a sophisticated apparatus in place in order to investigate the
application and the responses, and to impose and collect the additional
duties: its own attorneys, accountants, and economists. Thus, unfair trade
actions are a rich man's game for large industries with significant market
share as well as for developed and strong developing countries.2 20 Least
211 Id. at 130.
216 Paul C. Rosenthal & Robert T.C. Bermylen, The WTO Antidumping and Subsidies
Agreements: Did the United States Achieve Its Objectives During the Uruguay Round?, 31
L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 871, 886-87 (2000).
217 Piskorski, supra note 203, at 610.
218 Id.
219 See generally Bown, supra note 109.
220 See N. Gregory Mankiw & Phillip L. Swagel, Antidumping: The Third Rail of Trade
Policy, FOREIGN POLICY, Dec. 2005 (describing antidumping applicants as "favored
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developed countries, like Haiti, may be WTO members, but are likely to
lack both the laws enabling unfair trade remedies and any agencies
equipped to investigate and enforce those laws.221
While some may argue that the high cost of bringing an antidumping
suit or defending one is a problem because it prevents small industries from
bringing a claim, this may not be the strongest argument against such
claims-all it means is that smaller industries are unlikely to use this
mechanism to hobble competition, and will need to develop some other
strategy for competing (such as developing better, less expensive products).
In the case of larger industries, deciding whether or not to participate in an
antidumping or other trade remedy proceeding is a business decision, in
which the industry participants will weigh the potential cost against the
potential gain.
The real cost concern is the long-term cost of such remedies to
consumers, and whether or not trade remedies pose a severe long-term
threat to the growth of local and global economies. As one prominent
economist describes it:
[T]he impact of antidumping tariffs falls most harshly on two groups
whose interests members of Congress should be working to protect:
the least well-off of their constituents and the vast majority of
American producers. All Americans pay higher prices for food and
housing, as a result of antidumping tariffs, but the burden is likely
greatest on the poor, because these necessities make up a larger share
of their spending. U.S. producers are affected because most items hit
with antidumping tariffs are not finished goods, but components that
are used to make other items.
222
In 2001, the Congressional Budget Office reported that although U.S.
trade policy is generally favorable to free trade, the antidumping duties
imposed by the United States (one of the world's most aggressive users of
antidumping laws) are a substantial impediment to trade, and impose net
costs on U.S. economy as a whole. 23 Nevertheless, the study admitted that
U.S. use of such measures had decreased since the WTO agreement went
industries that have powerful lobbies"), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20051201
faessay84708/n-gregory-mankiw-phillip-l-swagel/antidumping-the-third-rail-of-trade-
policy.html.
22 The following WTO member countries are indicated as lacking such apparatus in
2006: Baharain, Benin, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Fraso, Burundi, Chad, C6te
d'Ivoire, Macedonia, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali,
Myanmar, Namibia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland,
Switzerland, United Arab Emirates. ANTI-DuMPING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 40, at
Annex A.
222 Mankiw & Swagel, supra note 220.
223 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 152, at xi.
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into place in 1995 and it was no longer the most aggressive Member in the
WTO, 224 the average U.S. duty rate decreased,22 and mandatory sunset
review meant that U.S. duties were no longer in place "long enough to be
effectively permanent for all practical purposes (though admittedly they
were still in place longer than the five years anticipated in the Antidumping
Agreement). 226
While research failed to show a more updated analysis than the 2001
study, an examination of U.S. use of antidumping measures shows that the
United States is no longer even near the top of aggressors in initiating new
applications. The most aggressive initiators of applications in 2006 were
the European Union (twenty-five applications), followed by Argentina
(twenty applications), China (sixteen applications), Australia (fourteen
applications), India (eleven applications) , Panama (nine applications), and
Turkey (nine applications).2  In comparison, there were only eight
initiations in the United States 228 Nevertheless, in 2006, the United States
had more antidumping measures in place than any other Member (262
measures, down from 336 in 1999), indicating that measures are still not
timed-out as quickly as they possibly could or should be.229
Regardless of whether or not the numbers of antidumping measures
and initiations are decreasing or increasing, the Congressional Budget
Office study argues that antidumping measures are a drag on a country's
economy. Even if other countries do not retaliate with high tariff measures
of their own, the antidumping measures mean that other countries are less
eager to purchase the aggressor's exports by an amount roughly the same as
the reduction in imports. Ultimately, the import restrictions "serve only to
keep employees (as well as capital assets, land, and any other factors of
production that are not specific to the industry) from being forced by the
market to shift from the protected industry to other, more productive
economic sectors. 23°
There have been studies of the cost of antidumping duties on the U.S.
economy. One study of duties levied between 1987 and 1992 estimated that
thirty such duties reduced U.S. economic welfare by $275 million annually
and cost U.S. consumers between $500 million and $800 million each
year.23 A 1999 study, which focused on the dynamics of foreign product
224 Id. at xv.
225 See id. at xvii.
226 See id.
227 ANTI-DUMPING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 40, at Annex C.
228 id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 4.
231 See James M. DeVault, The Welfare Effects of U.S. Antidumping Duties, 7 OPEN
ECON. REv. 19 (1996).
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pricing when faced with dumping duties, estimated the welfare loss to the
U.S. economy to be in the range of $2 billion to $4 billion annually.
23 2
Extrapolation of this number to determine the welfare loss to the global
economy caused by antidumping duties is beyond the scope of this study;
however, it may be that the loss, even as large as it may be, is offset by the
increase in global freer trade brought about by the WTO and the Uruguay
Accord-the $10 trillion increase in trade. While the author of this article
is but a lowly lawyer unskilled in higher economics, as an estimate, if the
U.S. loss is between $2 and $4 billion annually, and the United States is
responsible for approximately one-fifth of the antidumping measures in
place (262 out of 1099 in 2006), then the average cost to the global
economy is between $10 and $20 billion annually. As compared to the $10
trillion increase in global trade, this cost may be affordable. The concern,
however, is that the cost is borne by those least able to afford it-
consumers. Therefore, the logical implication is that implementation
measures should minimize the availability of antidumping measures even if
abandonment is impracticable.
D. Trade Remedies as Contra to the Free Market
Many economists traditionally argue that antidumping is unjustifiable
for two reasons: it ignores and even hinders any global movement towards
free trade and it often has a negative impact on competition in domestic
markets.233 The classical economist argues that antidumping and other
trade remedies are dead-weight losses and interfere with efficient market
flow. A deadweight loss is the reduction in consumer surplus from the
under-consumption of the good plus over-production of the Food due to the
higher price that results from a protectionist measure. When an
antidumping, countervailing, or safeguards tariff is imposed, the price for a
good produced abroad and sold domestically is raised, making consumers in
the home country worse off. 35 So, for example, as one critic phrased it,
assume the United States places a $30 tariff on a pair of Indonesian dress
shoes. Thus, a pair of dress shoes that could be obtained for $50 in
Indonesia, would sell for $80 plus taxes in the United States.236 The $30
tariff makes the purchase of the shoes in the United States pointless,
232 Michael P. Gallaway, Bruce A. Blonigen & John E. Flynn, Welfare Costs of U.S.
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 49 J. INT'L ECON. 201 (1999).
233 Gunnar Niels & Adriaan ten Kate, Trusting Antitrust to Dump Antidumping:
Abolishing Antidumping in Free Trade Agreements Without Replacing It with Competition
Law, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 29 (1997).
234 Emile Dreuil, James Anderson, Walter Block & Michael Saliba, Trade Gap: The
Fallacy ofAnti World-Trade Sentiment, 45 J. Bus. ETHICS 269 (2003).
235 Id. at 270.
236 id.
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"though domestic sellers are made better off, consumers are made worse
off. 237 The tariffs, therefore, result in an involuntary redistribution of well-
being from consumers to sellers. Because there are typically far fewer
sellers of a good than buyers, significantly more people are made worse off
by such tariffs. Domestic consumers will buy fewer shoes, while domestic
sellers will be encouraged to over-produce due to the higher prices brought
by tariffs, resulting in a net loss in well-being to the entire society.
E. Trade Remedies as Encouraging National and International Cartelization
In addition to finding that the WTO unfair trade mechanisms are
problematic in application and expensive to consumers, policy critics argue
that they are anti-competitive in effect because they encourage cartelization
on both a national and an international scale.238 Critics assert that while
these forms of protection have been imposed under the label of promoting
"fair trade," they can easily be used by cartel-like industrial groupings in
one country as a way of preventing foreign competition. In other words, in
mandating that 25% of the home industry participate in the petition, unfair
trade actions encourage price-setting that is backed by the home
government when the petition proves to be successful. 239  Thus,
"antidumping law facilitates the formation, maintenance, and enforcement
of cartels.,240
Furthermore, antidumping measures lend themselves to manipulation
by cartels. One critic indicated that such cartelization is not mere theory by
using the U.S. ferrosilicon industry as an illustrative example. 2 '
Apparently, in 1989, the three largest U.S. producers of ferrosilicon began
meeting to increase their market share and prices in the United States and
Europe by eliminating competition from producers in Asia and South
237 Id.
238 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization, 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 725 (2000).
239 Michael Y. Chung, U.S. Antidumping Law: A Look at the New Legislation, 20 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG., 495, 522 (1995) (citing Antidumping Agreement, supra note 32, art.
5, para. 5.4.).
240 Pierce, supra note 238, at 726; but see James C. Hartigan, An Antidumping Law Can
be Procompetitive, 5 PAC. ECON. REVIEW 1 (2000) (arguing that a cartel is unlikely because
participants' long term best interest is in breaking ranks with any such cartel, and that while
antidumping laws affect both domestic and foreign firms' strategic behavior, the impact on
these firms is ambiguous, and suggesting that a weak injury standard should be used in order
to encourage firms to break ranks); Christopher T. Taylor, The Economic Effects of
Withdrawn Antidumping Investigations: Is There Evidence of Collusive Settlements?, 62 J.
INT'L ECON. 295 (2004) (arguing that although there is an accepted wisdom that withdrawn
antidumping petitions are a signal of collusion, upon analysis of monthly import data, such
collusion is infrequent).
241 Pierce, supra note 238, at 726.
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242 Terpa
America. Their plan was both ingenious and effective: the three U.S.
producers refused to sell at below-cartel prices. 243 Consequently, Asian and
South American producers quickly gained market share by selling at lower
prices. The U.S. producers' consequential loss in market-share provided
them with an "ideal" record to support antidumping and countervailing
duties complaints, which cartel members promptly filed in both the United
States and the European Community. 244 The cartel's complaints were
successful, effectively precluding non-cartel producers from five countries
from competing in those two markets, and significantly raising the price of
ferrosilicon in both places.245 Eventually, however, the United States
learned of the cartel action and removed the antidumping measures. 246
In conclusion, while there is a certain amount of support for the
criticism leveled at trade remedies, this criticism can largely be rebutted by
tweaking those remedies. For example, the term "unfair trade" is a
misnomer because the importer's behavior lacks any resemblance to the
FTC Act's definition of unfair competition.247 Additionally, the remedies
themselves generally run counter to the freer market principle of the WTO-
especially antidumping and safeguards measures-and governments face a
tremendous amount of political pressure at home to protect or advance
domestic industries. As long as the imposition of such measures is
transparent and faces time limits as required by WTO rules, the damage
inflicted on the freer market principle is limited, as one can see by
comparing the estimated costs of antidumping measures as against the
increase in global trade of goods post-1994.248 Furthermore, while
antidumping calculations necessarily involve unjustified comparisons and
inaccurate calculations, if the WTO panels and Appellate Body continue to
interpret the Agreement rules narrowly, then again, such measures are likely
to inflict only limited damage. Finally, while cartelization is theoretically
encouraged by the availability of antidumping actions, as long as nations
are able to impose antitrust measures against such cartels, again the
possibility of damage to a freer global market is limited. Part VII will
provide a further defense of unfair trade remedies.
242 Id. at 726.




247 See discussion accompanying supra note 41.
248 Compare text accompanying supra notes 231-32 (discussing cost of antidumping
measures in United States of $500-800 million/year) to text accompanying supra notes 23-
25 (discussing increase in global trade of goods from $6 trillion to $10 trillion in the first ten
years of the WTO).
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VII. CONTEXTUAL DEFENSE OF TRADE REMEDIES: NECESSARY
AND NOT SO EVIL
A. Long-term Effect of WTO Limitations
Even though antidumping and safeguards are by nature protectionist, it
is unlikely that this body of law will be repealed anytime in the near future,
because of the widespread and largely unjustified premise that the free
market is subject to failure and must be "corrected" at times by
governmental oversight. Although it might be ideal to dump antidumping
as a remedy,249 this is unlikely to happen. Nevertheless the potentially
deleterious effect of such measures is offset by three realities: 1) the WTO
rules allow them only under very limited conditions and for a limited period
of time, 2) as discussed previously, jurisprudence from Panel Reports and
the Appellate Body has strengthened those limitations, and 3) the use of
unfair trade remedies is driven by market participants and is therefore
subject to the ebbs and flows of normal market behavior.
The number of antidumping measures put in place has leveled off, as
has the number of initiations: after a spike in 2001 (during a recession that
resulted after the Asian financial crisis which began in 1998), the number of
initiations has receded as the world economy has heated up. Thus, while
there were a total of 313 initiations in 2001, the number has consistently
decreased since then and was down to 163 initiations in 2006.250 The
number of measures in place is relatively stable: 1,434 in 2001 and 1,502 in
2006. Safeguards and CVD measures show similar patterns. 251 As one
would expect, during a recession, industries are more threatened by imports,
and therefore more likely to apply for a trade remedy, but are less likely to
do so during a period of growth. Thus, while antidumping, countervailing
duty, and safeguards remedies have a negative effect on competition, they
are expensive and difficult to use, and thus assert only a limited drag on
global commerce.
The WTO sunset review provision anticipates that antidumping
measures will be in place for a maximum of approximately five years. In
1998, the Congressional Budget Office concluded that U.S. antidumping
measures before implementation of the WTO sunset review tended to last
249 See Jorge Miranda, Should Antidumping Laws be Dumped?, 28 LAW & POL'Y 1N INT'L
Bus. 255, 288 (1996) (concluding that antidumping "laws play an important role in
sustaining trade reform, which arguably (through 'trade diversion') has [sic] a smaller
welfare cost than relief through alternative measures").
250 See graphs 5 & 6, supra Part V.A.3.
251 See graphs 1-4, supra Part V.A. 1-2.
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much longer than those imposed by any other country: 10.6 years on
average.25' The United States started implementation of sunset reviews in
2000,253 and the Congressional Budget Office was able to incorporate that
year's surge of sunset reviews into its analysis. 254 In 2001, the median
duration of active measures from 1994 to date was 7.0 years, but more than
one in five U.S. measures had been in effect for ten or more years, one in
nine had been in effect for fifteen or more years, and one measure was in
effect for more than twenty-eight years.255 By comparison, Canada had a
median of 3.4 years, the European Union 3.5 years, and New Zealand 3.1
years.256 Research fails to disclose current statistics on the U.S. duration
rate, but considering the high number of measures in place (292 in 2006,
down from 300 in 2000) as compared to the low number if initiations for
the past six years (averaging twenty-seven initiationsZ57), it seems safe to
assume that U.S. sunset reviews are resulting in terminations to bring the
median duration closer to the WTO five-year prescription, though perhaps
not as quickly or efficiently as possible.
B. The Effect of Supply and Demand Rules on Trade Remedy Measures
In addition to the limitations posed by the WTO Trade Remedy
agreements, normal market pressures can force countries to reduce or repeal
measures already in place. Two examples will be used to demonstrate this
effect, one from a developing country and the other from a developed
country, both involving commodities that are used globally: Portland gray
cement and steel.
1. The Cement Industry: China, Egypt, and Jamaica
Production in China and Egypt is extensive and growing. The world's
largest cement-producing country is China, which has the capacity to
produce 800 million tons of cement each year due to a number of recently-
built plants.25 8 Egypt has expanded its cement production259 in a "Special
252 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 152, at 8.
253 Id. at 8, 27.
254 Id. at 27.
255 Id. at 42.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 23.
258 WANG HENGCHEN ET AL., CLEANER PRODUCTION AND CIRCULAR ECONOMY FOR
CEMENT INDUSTRIAL SECTOR IN CHINA 1 (Oct. 2004), http://www.chinacp.org.cn/eng/cppub
/cement/Wang2004.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
259 Rasheed: Egypt ranks 5 in cement export, ARABIC NEWS, Nov. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/041101/2004110121 .html (reporting that
Egypt's cement industry witnessed a big leap in 2004 to an estimated at thirty-seven million
tons a year, ten million of which are exported).
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Economic Zone," in which the government provides tax and other
incentives in an effort to encourage foreign investment. 260 These incentives
may amount to an indirect subsidization of the export of cement and are
against WTO provisions.
In contrast, Jamaica privatized its sole cement factory, Caribbean
Cement Company, Ltd. in the late 1990s. Caribbean Cement now employs
250 people and supplies 90% of the cement used in Jamaica's buildings and
roads.26 In 1998, the financial markets in Asia began to collapse, leaving
Chinese and Egyptian cement manufacturers an oversupply. Thus, in order
to keep operating at capacity, they needed to find a market for the excess.
Consequently, they started selling cement around the world. In 2003,
Caribbean Cement believed that its ongoing process of renovation was
jeopardized by the low prices of imported Chinese and Egyptian Cement
and pursued an antidumping application against Chinese cement,262 a
countervailing duty application against Egyptian cement,263  and a
safeguards application against all other potential importers.264 Two years
later, China decided to build a massive dam across the Yangtze River (the
"Three Gorges Dam"), and started using most of its own cement production
as well as importing cement.265 At the same time, hurricane damage in the
United States resulted in increasing demand for cement.266 The result was a
worldwide shortage in cement and rising prices. Faced with a severe
shortage, the Jamaica Trade Board removed import duties for one year
260 Luciano Loffredo, Policies for Business in the Mediterranean Countries: The Arab
Republic of Egypt 6-7 (Mar. 7, 2005) (analyzing some of the incentives provided by the
Special Economic Zone project, which dates from 1997), available at http://unpanl.un.org
/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAIMED/UNPANO 1 8699.pdf, Adam Morrow,
American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, Welcome to the New World Order, Bus.
MONTHLY (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.amcham.org.eg/Publications/Business
Monthly/December%2002/feature.asp.
261 Caribbean Cement Company Ltd., Carib Cement Corporate Profile, http://teleios.co.tt
/caribcement/about (last visited Mar. 8, 2008). In 2003, the author helped prepare
antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard applications for Carib Cement.
262 See JAM. ANTIDUMPING AND SUBSIDIES COMM'N, STATEMENT OF REASONS (Dec. 16,
2003), http://www.mct.gov.jm/SOR.AD-01.2003.Initiation.pdf.
263 Anatomy of a Cement Controversy, THE JAM. OBSERVER, Dec. 31, 2003,
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/magazines/business/html/20031230t1 80000-0500_53677
obs_ anatomy-of a cementcontroversy.asp (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
264 Twenty-six Percent Safeguard Duty on Imported Cement, THE JAM. OBSERVER, July
21, 2004, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/magazines/business/html/20040720t220000-
0500_63165 obs safeguard -duty-onjimported cement.asp (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
265 See Demand for Cement in China to Reach 1.3 Billion Metric Tons in 2010,
MARKETWIRE, Oct. 12, 2006, http://www.marketwire.com/mw/release.do?id=701420&k
=cement.
266 Roy A. Grancher, U.S. Cement: Massive Reinvestment for Capacity Addition, CEMENT
AMERICAS, Sept. 1, 2006, http://cementamericas.com/mag/cement-us cementmassive
/index.html.
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starting May 17, 2006, thus canceling the antidumping and safeguards
duties imposed only two and three years prior.26 7
2. The U.S. Steel Industry
As in developing countries like Jamaica, market and political pressure
to repeal antidumping measures in the face of increased demand may be
present in large, developed countries like the United States. Although the
U.S. steel industry once symbolized the might of American industrial
power, it lost its competitive edge against foreign steel producers during the
latter half of the twentieth century. 26" The reasons for this fall were several.
For one thing, U.S. producers faced the highest unit labor costs in the world
from as early as 1958, and labor costs continued to increase to the end of
the century. 69  Furthermore, because U.S. producers had enjoyed
dominance in the domestic market for a long time through oligopoly, they
did not make efforts to modernize their aging facilities. 7o In the
intervening time, foreign steel producers built better facilities employing
advanced production technologies, began producing large amounts of steel,
and consequently by 2001 steel prices dropped to a twenty-year low.
271
Because they could not compete against foreign steel, eighteen U.S. steel
producers filed for bankruptcy between January 1998 and June 2001.272
Consequently, U.S. steel producers brought their considerable political
clout to bear and applied for and were granted protection through trade
remedies, including both antidumping actions and countervailing duties.
27 3
The federal government also granted the steel industry a substantial amount
of aid in the form of pension bailouts, tax refunds, environmental regulation
exemption subsidies, "buy American" requirements, and emergency loan
guarantee schemes.274 Foreign producers objected, petitioning the WTO's
dispute resolution body and filing retaliatory measures that nearly
precipitated a global trade war in the steel industry.2 75 On March 20, 2002,
the Bush Administration applied safeguard measures to protect U.S. steel
from all imports by increasing tariffs of up to 30% ad valorem276 as well as
267 JAM. MINISTRY OF ENERGY, MINING AND TELECOMM, ISSUES RELATED TO SHORTAGE
OF CEMENT 15 (June 20, 2006), available at http://www.mct.gov.jm/Ministry%20Papers
%202006/Ministry%2OPaper/o20-%20Cement%2OFinal%2OJune%2020,%202006.pdf.
268 Y.S. Lee, Test of Multilateralism in International Trade: U.S. Steel Safeguards, 25




272 Id. at 73.
273 Id.
274 Lee, supra note 268, at 73.
275 Id. at 75.
276 See Memorandum: Action Under Section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 Concerning
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applying quotas to a range of steel imports.
2 77
The U.S. steel safeguard was met with a firestorm of negative reaction.
Two days after the safeguard measure was announced, the European
Community filed a complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body;
Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, Venezuela, Norway, and China joined the
complaint.278  When consultations between the United States and the
complainants failed, the WTO established a dispute settlement panel to
determine whether the safeguard measure complied with GATT rules.2 79
Ultimately, the Appellate Body found that the steel safeguard measure was
non-compliant, 280 but it took two years for the WTO process to be
completed. Within twenty days of the Appellate Body decision, U.S.
President Bush withdrew the safeguard measure because the industry had
taken advantage of the protective period to retool and revamp its aging
plants and no longer needed such measures.
281
However, the repeal of the steel safeguard measure is not the end of
the story. Although the safeguard was repealed, antidumping and CVD
measures were not, having survived sunset review. 282  Thus, steel
consumers argued that the price of steel imported into the United States
remained unnaturally high due to unfair trade remedies. 283 U.S. automakers
requested duties be rolled back because of competition with foreign
automobiles made more cheaply with steel sold at lower non-U.S. prices. 
84
As of the time of this writing, despite the repeal of the safeguard, the price
of hot and cold-rolled steel used in automaking continues to rise in the U.S.,
due to a significant increase in world-wide demand and also perhaps to a
consolidation of steel-manufacturers. 285  Thus, market forces can assert
political pressure to limit, terminate, or render irrelevant the imposition of
trade remedies.
Certain Steel Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,593 (Mar. 5, 2002).
277 See To Facilitate Positive Adjustment to Competition from Imports of Certain Steel
Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,553 (Mar. 5, 2002).
278 Lee, supra note 268, at 71.
279 Id.
280 Appellate Body Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Certain Steel Products, 172, WT/DS248, 249, 251, 252, 253, 254, 258, 259/AB/R (Nov.
10, 2003).
281 See Proclamation No. 7741, supra note 108.
282 ITC Continues Hot-Rolled Steel Duties Despite Consumer Complaints, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Apr. 22, 2005, sec. 16, available at 2005 WLNR 6287054.
283 Id.
284 See Auto Suppliers Applaud Congressional Resolution on Steel Hearings, THE AUTO
CHANNEL, Feb. 10, 2005, http://www.theautochannel.com/news/2005/02/l0/028331.html;
see also Japan, U.S. Automakers Seek End to U.S. Antidumping Duties on Steel Sheets, JIJI
PRESS ENG. NEWS SERV. (Sept. 8, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 15620661.
285 Tom Stundza, Raw Materials Costs are Boosting Steel Sheet Prices, PURCHASING,
Jan. 9, 2008, available at http://www.purchasing.com/article/CA6518710.htm.html.
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C. WTO Controversy
While the WTO agreements have resulted in a relatively liberalized
world market in goods, trade in agricultural commodities has not been
similarly liberalized for a number of complicated reasons, chief among
them being problems in reaching an accord on how to scale back
agricultural subsidies.
In order to be allowed to accede to the benefits offered by the WTO's
freer trade policies, members had to agree to repeal all direct and indirect
limitations on the import of goods except for the scheduled tariffs.2 86 As
mentioned previously, the CVD Accord prohibits two narrow categories of
subsidies: those contingent upon export and those contingent upon the use
of domestic over imported goods.287  Actionable subsidies are
"countervailable" if they cause material injury to domestic industry.2 88
Additionally, other subsidies that provide benefits to a specific enterprise or
industry, even if not prohibited, may nonetheless be subject to
countervailing duties if they cause "serious prejudice" to another WTO
member.289
Subsidies in the agricultural arena proved to be a contentious issue.
Developed countries have a large number of agricultural support programs
and during the Uruguay Round found it almost impossible to reach an
286 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2501 & ff (1994) (statutes
promulgated to enable GATT accords & tariff schedules); see also World Trade
Organization, A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, http://www.wto.org
/english/docse/legal-e/ursum.e.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2008):
"The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations", [sic] signed by ministers in Marrakesh on April 15, 1994 is 550
pages long and contains legal texts which spell out the results of the negotiations
since the Round was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986. In
addition to the texts of the agreements, the Final Act also contains texts of
Ministerial Decisions and Declarations which further clarify certain provisions of
some of the agreements.
The Final Act covers all the negotiating areas cited in the Punta del Este
Declaration with two important exceptions. The first is the results of the "market
access negotiations" in which individual countries have made binding
commitments to reduce or eliminate specific tariffs and non-tariff barriers to
merchandise trade. These concessions are recorded in national schedules that form
an integral part of the Final Act. The second is the "initial commitments" on
liberalization of trade in services. These commitments on liberalization are also
recorded in national schedules.
287 CVD Agreement, supra note 32, art. 3.1.
288 See id. art. 15 n.45.
289 Id. art. 5(c).
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accord on how to scale back those subsidies. 290 Accord has been difficult to
reach as this is a highly emotional subject worldwide-large subsidies to
agriculture in the United States and European Union are historically based
on concerns about food security, quality, past food shortages, and the
special place farms and farmers have in a society's history.291 The resulting
compromise under the Agreement on Agriculture permits the use of export
subsidies, in contradiction of the CVD Agreement, but only to the extent
that they were listed in the subsidizing WTO member's schedule (thus
adding transparency), and were not increased in amount.292 Furthermore,
Article Thirteen of the Agreement on Agriculture provided a grace period
for export subsidies: until the end of the "peace period" on January 1, 2004,
scheduled export subsidies were exempt from actions based on the
prohibitions set forth in the Countervailing Duties Agreement's Article
Three; thereafter, Members could challenge such agricultural subsidies.293
It was anticipated at the Uruguay Round that future rounds of
negotiations would lead to stronger and more specific agreements on how to
liberalize agricultural trade through reduction of subsidies, but this hope
was dashed during the September 2003 Doha Round at Cancun when
developing countries opposed a U.S. and EU joint proposal on the grounds
that its agricultural liberalization provisions were insufficient.294
Overlapping these negotiations, in February 2003, Brazil requested the
establishment of a dispute settlement panel, asserting that certain subsidies
granted to U.S. cotton farmers were causing serious prejudice to Brazilian
cotton producers.295 That dispute resulted in a September 2004 panel report
finding that some of the complained-of subsidies were in violation of the
296CVD agreement. The United States scaled back some of the cotton
subsidies that the Panel found objectionable before the WTO's July 1, 2005
deadline,297 and then promised at the December 2005 Doha meeting in
Hong Kong to terminate cotton export subsidies.2 98 Nevertheless, exact
290 See MELAKU GEBOYE DESTA, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS: FROM GATT 1947 TO THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 207, 211 (2002).
291 See Stewart, supra note 59, at 704.
292 See Agreement on Agriculture, art. 3.3 & 8, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
293 Karen Halverson Cross, King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause':
the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 149, 153, 165 (2006).
294 Id. at 151-52.
295 Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton: Report of the Panel, 111 1. 1
& 1.2, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004).
296 See id.
297 See Bruce Odessey, U.S. Dept. of State, United States Partially Complies with WTO
Cotton-Subsidy Ruling, July 1, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2005/Jul/01-228642
.html.
298 See Ministerial Declaration, Doha Worke Programme (Dec. 18, 2005), WT/Min(05)
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details and modalities of the liberalization of trade with regard to
agricultural subsidies remains a sticking point in WTO negotiations, which
were temporarily suspended in mid 2006.299 As of this writing, informal
negotiations are continuing, but agreement has not yet been reached.300
The United States has provided federal subsidies for agriculture since
Roosevelt's New Deal. 30 1 Originally the Agricultural Adjustment Act was
intended to provide relief for American farmers who had suffered from the
volatility of market prices for agricultural commodities, 30 2 but it has grown
substantially since then. Under successive legislation, cotton farmers in
2003 were eligible for six types of subsidies: 1) Marketing loan payments in
which farmers could use their cotton crop as collateral for a government
loan and if the world price for cotton fell below a certain threshold, they
could repay the loan at the lower price and retain the difference; 30 3 2) direct
payments under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, under
which the government pays farmers a set price for the cotton;30 4 3) counter-
cyclical payments and other emergency assistance designed to protect
cotton farmers against a decline in cotton prices; 30 5 4) crop insurance;30 6 5)
export credit guarantees to encourage exports of agricultural products to
/DSC (Dec. 22, 2005); Rob Portman, America's Proposal to Kick-Start the Doha Trade
Talks, FIN. TIMES, Oct 10, 2005, at 15; Sungjoon Cho, Half Full or Half Empty?: The Hong
Kong WTO Ministerial Conference Has Delivered an Interim Deal for the Doha Round
Negotiation, ASIL INSIGHT, Dec. 29, 2005, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/12
/insights051229.html.
299 See Press Release, World Trade Organization, Talks Suspended: Today There Are
Only Losers (July 24, 2006), http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news06_e/mod06_
summary_24julye.htm (WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy declaring suspension of the
Doha round due to difficulties in reaching agreement on how to handle domestic support (i.e.
subsidies) and agricultural issues).
300 See, e.g., Press Release, World Trade Organization, "We are Closer to Our Goal but It
is Not Yet Done"-Lamy (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.wto.org/English/newse/news07
_e/tnc -chair-report _dec07_e.htm. Ambassador Crawford Falconer, chairperson of the
agricultural negotiations, circulated a draft "modalities" paper showing proposed formulas to
cut tariffs and trade-distorting subsidies in agriculture, as part of the Doha round of
negotiations. See also World Trade Organization, Chairperson's Texts 2008, http://www
.wto.org/english/tratope/agric e/chairtexts08_e.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2008); New
Agriculture Papers Leave Open Key Questions on Market Access, 26 INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Jan. 11, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 609366 (highlighting new working documents
released on Jan. 4, 2008 by the chairman of the WTO agriculture negotiations).
301 See Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-26 (2000).
302 See GENE SMILEY, RETHINKING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 82-83 (2002).
303 See Cross, supra note 293, at 155.
'04 Id. at 154.
305 Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 7.223, WT/DS267/R,
(Sept. 8, 2004) (adopted Mar. 21, 2005).
306 Id. f 7.456.
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foreign countries where financing may not be available; 30 7 and 6) "step 2"
payments, which encourage U.S. buyers to purchase U.S. cotton by
subsidizing sales when the price of U.S.-grown cotton exceeds a benchmark
price. 30 8 It was the last two types of subsidies-the marketing loan and
"step 2" payments-that the WTO Panel found to be actionable as export
and domestic preference subsidies.30 9 Notably, the Cotton Panel opinion
was one of only two WTO decisions finding "serious prejudice" resulting
from the use of domestic subsidies, and is the only WTO decision to
involve a challenge of domestic agricultural subsidies. 3 0 The United States
filed an appeal, but while the Appellate Body disagreed with some of the
reasoning, it upheld the panel's findings in all significant respects.
3 11
The legalities and classification of subsidization under the WTO
Agreements are complicated, but in fact, these types of subsidies have had
enormous effects both domestically and internationally. Although
originally agricultural subsidies were intended for poor Depression-Era
farmers at the mercy of wind and weather, today the vast majority are given
to a very small percentage of U.S. farms: of the subsidy payments made to
U.S. cotton producers between 1995 and 2003, 80% of the funds were paid
to only 10% of the producers, each of whom received on average $500,000
per year.312 In one year, the United States government allocated almost $44
million in cotton subsidies to ten agribusinesses.3 3  As a result of the
intense subsidization brought on by intense lobbying, U.S. cotton farmers
are protected from international competition and have become inefficient
producers: the average cost to produce a pound of cotton in the United
States in 2001 was almost three times higher than that of other major cotton
producing countries such as China, Brazil, and Benin.3 14
As corrosive as these subsidies have been on the efficiency of the U.S.
cotton industry, they have allegedly had devastating effects on cotton
farmers especially in sub-Saharan Africa's least developed countries where• 315
over 10 million people depend directly on cotton production. Contrary to
307 See id. 7.240 (citing Agricultural Trade Act of 1978, 7 U.S.C. § 5622(g) (2000)).
308 Id. 7.2 10; see also Cross, supra note 293 at 157.
309 Panel Report, supra note 305, 7.2 10.
310 See id. The other decision is Panel Report, Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting
the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2,
1998) (adopted July 23, 1998) (finding that, allowing for certain physical differences,
domestically produced automobiles undercut the price of EC-produced cars by over 30%).
311 See Panel Report, supra note 295, 377, 458, 623-26.
312 Envtl. Working Group, Farm Subsidy Database, http://farm.ewg.org/farm /index.php
(last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
313 Cross, supra note 293 at 159.
314 Jasper Womach, Cotton Production and Support in the United States 13 fig. 10 (Cong.
Research Serv., RL 32442, June 24, 2004).
315 Kevin C. Kennedy, The Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy
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some U.S. analysis positing that subsidized goods from developed countries
benefit the developing countries that buy them, the market distortion caused
by U.S. subsidized cotton has caused devastating harm to countries such as
Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Togo, because they have to compete
with the artificially low cotton prices on the world market:
The adjusted world price for cotton in mid-2004 was nearly $.56 per
pound, the highest it has been in seven seasons, but still down from
its 1994-1995 high of over $.76 per pound. Cotton growers in Benin,
Burkina Faso, and Mali increased the quantity of their cotton exports
between 1994-1995 and 2001-2002, but saw their export earnings
from cotton decline even as the quantities of their cotton exports
increased during the same seven-year period. In fact, "[o]ver 90% of
the cotton produced in the WCA countries is for export." From 1999
to 2002, their production increased by 14%, but their export earnings
fell by 3 1%.31P
D. Overall Costs of Agricultural Subsidies
It is estimated that between 1995 and 2003, the United States
government spent over $2 billion in payments under the cotton "Step 2"
program alone,317 and the United States is not the worst offender. U.S. farm
subsidies are approximately one-third of the European Union's, which
subsidizes cows at the rate of $2.20 per day (more than the daily living
expenses of many people in least developed countries).31 8 It is estimated
that developed countries pay more than $1 billion in agricultural subsidies
per day.319 Studies have estimated that eliminating such agricultural trade
barriers would provide an economic benefit to world trade of between $50
billion and $185 billion, and expanding this analysis to include the effects
of liberalization on the rate of productivity growth would raise these
estimates by amounts ranging from 50% to more than 100%, depending on
the study.32
According to the guesstimate given above, the worldwide cost of
antidumping procedures is somewhere between $10 and $20 billion
annually. This is a drop in the bucket compared to the $50 to $185 billion
that the unlimited agricultural subsidies are costing global consumers.
Rather than focusing on eliminating antidumping measures, the focus
for Sub-Saharan Africa: Sowing the Seeds of False Hope for Sub-Saharan Africa's Cotton
Farmers?, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 307, 315 (2005).
316 Id.
317 Cross, supra note 293 at 157.
31i Editorial, Cow Politics. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at A30.
319 id.
320 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALIZING WORLD AGRICULTURAL TRADE:
A SURVEY 3 (2005).
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should be on reaching accord with regard to the further limitation and
phasing-out of agricultural subsidies as was done previously with regard to
goods through the WTO agreements.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although antidumping and the other 'unfair' trade remedies are
inherently anti-market and expensive to pursue, they are limited in scope
and application. Furthermore, because the WTO requires that countries
report both initiation and measures in force on a regular basis, they are
transparent and therefore more vulnerable to challenge by other Members.
When challenged, Panels and the Appellate Body both regard such
measures suspiciously, and hold against them on sometimes overly
vigorous parsing of the applicable Agreement language. This negative bias
is in keeping with the WTO's freer market policy. Furthermore, the
negative findings put strong and generally effective pressure on an
offending country to repeal the nonconforming measure. Therefore, when
viewed in context, trade remedies have helped develop an international rule
of law with regard to trade of goods.
The WTO freer market policy, its encouragement of international
transparency, and the resulting gradual reduction in tariffs have been
productive-especially with regard to the international trade of goods.
Progress now needs to be made with regard to reduction of agricultural
subsidies so that global trade in agricultural products can show similar
growth. Multilateral agreement is difficult to achieve due to the growth of
the WTO and the complexity and controversial nature of the issue. Despite
the fact many commodity groups would just as soon prefer that the Doha
round "went away" because of concerns that the U.S. might give up more in
domestic agricultural subsidies reductions than it will gain in access to
foreign markets,32' the resultant increase in global trade of agricultural
commodities is ultimately likely to be similar to that previously
demonstrated with regard to goods. In contrast with the purported negative
effects of global warming, the WTO has proven that the rising tide of global
trade, indeed, floats most (if not all) boats.
321 See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra note 300.
